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Women played a surprisingly large role in the prosecution of crime
in medieval England. Although law, custom, and even Magna Carta
tried to restrict women's ability to prosecute, original archival re-
search reveals that more than a third of all thirteenth-century private
prosecutors were women. Women brought nearly two-thirds of the
homicide private prosecutions and all of the rape prosecutions. This
Article provides the first sustained analysis of female prosecution in
pre-modern times. Using an extensive data set from contemporane-
ous records, it attempts to explain why women were so prominent in
the private prosecution of crime, compares their success to that of
men, and investigates the social significance of women's prosecu-
tions.
Private prosecutions were criminal cases initiated and controlled
by ordinary persons, usually the crime victim, or, in homicide cases, a
relative. Prosecution involved pleading the case publicly before
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multiple courts over a period of several years. Legal representation
in criminal cases was uncommon, so ordinarily this pleading was
performed by the prosecutor herself. Nevertheless, because of the
nature of thirteenth-century trials, prosecution did not involve exam-
ination or cross-examination of witnesses.
That women brought so many private prosecutions is surprising
given their low status in the thirteenth century and middle ages more
generally. The most prominent thirteenth-century philosophers
taught that women were mentally inferior and thus naturally sub-
ordinate to men.' Governments excluded women from nearly all
positions of power. Inheritance customs bestowed the lion's share of
wealth on sons. And family law gave husbands the right to use phys-
ical force to chastise their wives as well as nearly absolute control
over property that either spouse brought into the marriage or acquir-
ed during it.
Nevertheless, recent studies have uncovered women's role in unex-
pected aspects of medieval life, from warfare and estate management
to civil litigation.2 These studies have begun to enrich our under-
standing of medieval women and show how women acted both with-
in and in opposition to prevailing gender norms. No one, however,
has rigorously analyzed women's large role in criminal prosecution
from quantitative and social as well as legal perspectives? A few his-
torians have discussed the inefficacy of restrictions on female prose-
cution,4 but because these scholars did not analyze the full range of
1. See generally Part I.A.
2. Rowena E. Archer, "How Ladies... Who Live on Their Manors Ought to Manage
Their Households and Estates".- Women as Landholders and Administrators in the Later
Middle Ages, in WOMAN IS A WORTHY WIGHT 149 (P.J.P. Goldberg ed., 1992); Emma
Hawkes, "[Sihe Will... Protect and Defend Her Rights Boldly by Law and Reason... ""
Women "s Knowledge of Common Law and Equity in Late-Medieval England, in MEDIEVAL
WOMEN AND THE LAW 145, 148-51 (Noel James Menuge ed., 2000) (women constituted 5% of
litigants in King's Bench and Common Pleas and 15% of litigants in Chancery); Megan
McLaughlin, The Woman Warrior Gender, Warfare and Society in Medieval Europe, 17
WOMEN'S STUD. 193 (1990); Sue Sheridan Walker, Introduction to WIFE AND WIDOW IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1, 6 (Sue Sheridan Walker ed., 1993) (noting that in one court session in
1225, 20% of all civil cases were brought by women seeking their dowers).
3. Even Doris Mary Stenton, whose pioneering work on early plea rolls made her an
expert on private prosecution, mentioned appeals only in passing in her book on women's
history, DORIS MARY STENTON, THE ENGLISHWOMAN IN HISTORY 66 (1957). While female
prosecutors have received little attention, female criminals are discussed in Barbara A.
Hanawalt, The Female Felon in Fourteenth-Century England, in WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL
SOCIETY 125 (Susan Mosher Stuard ed., 1976).
4. See, e.g., C.A.F. Meekings, Introduction to 1 THE 1235 SURREY EYRE 123-25 (C.A.F.
Meekings ed., 31 Surrey Record Society 1979): Patricia R. Orr, Non Potest Appellum Facere:
Criminal Charges Women Could Not-but Did-Bring in Thirteenth-Century English Royal
Courts of Justice, in THE FINAL ARGUMENT: THE IMPRINT OF VIOLENCE ON SOCIETY IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 141 (Donald Kagay & L.J. Andrew Villalon eds., 1998).
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manuscript sources, they did not notice the extent of women's
participation. Nor did they plumb the social implications of female
prosecution.
The study of female prosecutors provides a unique perspective on
ordinary women's lives during the middle ages. Much historical
writing focuses on royal or aristocratic women, in part because the
sources for them are substantially richer.' One advantage of legal
records is that the law touched nearly all classes, so legal history can
provide information on the lives of both the humble and the elite.
Since peasants far outnumbered aristocrats, understanding their lives
is crucial to a full understanding of the past.
To comprehend women's prosecutorial role, it is necessary to go
beyond formal statements of the law and investigate the law in ac-
tion. Even though treatises, Magna Carta, and abstract statements in
legal decision purported to restrict women's ability to sue, judges
opened the courts to women's prosecutions by ignoring these
restrictions unless the defendant objected. Since defendants seldom
had counsel, they usually lacked the legal knowledge and skill to
object; when they did object, judges enforced the letter of the law
and quashed the prosecution. Nevertheless, judges often sent ob-
jecting defendants to jury trial anyway under the fiction that the king
was prosecuting the defendant, thereby reviving the prosecution de
facto.6
This Article focuses on the thirteenth century, which was probably
the zenith of female prosecution in England. During the second half
of the thirteenth century, private prosecutions, whether brought by
men or women, became much less common, and presentment, a form
of public prosecution that excluded women, became the most com-
mon method of initiating criminal cases.7
Part I of this Article sets out the social and legal background of
private prosecution and uses two cases to illustrate its basic features.
5. See, e.g., Barbara A. Hanawalt, Lady Lisle's Networks of Influence, in WOMEN AND
POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES 188 (Mary Erler & Maryanne Kowaleski eds., 1988); Lois L.
Huneycutt, Intercession and the High-Medieval Queen. The Esther Topos, in POWER OF THE
WEAK: STUDIES ON MEDIEVAL WOMEN 126 (Jennifer Carpenter & Sally-Beth MacLean eds.,
1995); Jo Ann McNamara & Suzanne Wemple, The Power of Women Through the Family in
Medieval Europe, 500-1100, in WOMEN AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra, at 83; Eliza-
beth McCartney, Ceremonies and Privileges of Office: Queenship in Late Medieval France, in
POWER OF THE WEAK, supra, at 178; John Carmi Parsons, The Queen's Intercession in
Thirteenth-Century England, in POWER OF THE WEAK, supra, at 147. For a notable exception,
see Judith M. Bennett, Public Power and Authority in the Medieval English Countryside, in
WOMEN AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra, at 18 (focusing on peasant women).
6. See generally Part II.C.
7. Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-
Century England, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (2001).
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Part II documents the number and variety of cases brought by
women and tries to explain why women brought so many prosecu-
tions. While women prosecuted all kinds of crime, their role was
largest in homicide and rape. One reason that women brought so
many criminal cases was that legal rules usually required the prose-
cutor to be the crime victim. In addition, when more than one person
could be the prosecutor (as in homicide cases), women were probab-
ly favored because they were immune from trial by battle. Part III
analyzes the outcomes of women's prosecutions. It finds that women
were more likely than men to settle their cases and that juries were
equally likely to convict those accused by women as those accused by
men. Part IV explores the social significance of female prosecutors.
The ability to prosecute gave women a modicum of power and allow-
ed them to assume a public role, albeit a limited one. The power and
public role of prosecution was not limited to an elite: female prose-
cutors were remarkably diverse, including rich and poor, never-
married, married, and widowed. Nevertheless, private prosecutions
by women probably sometimes reflected family pressure as well as
female power, and the public role that prosecution afforded women
was limited by the fact that prosecution at this time seldom involved
presentation of evidence or examination of witnesses.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Position of Women in Thirteenth-Century England
Whether one looks to government, church, law, or the family,
thirteenth-century women occupied a subordinate position. Women
were excluded from nearly all official positions in government. There
were no female sheriffs, judges, or jurors.' The church denied women
8. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 483 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1898) (noting that
women were excluded "from all public functions.., subject to few if any real exceptions"). As
with many generalizations, there were occasional exceptions. For example, the daughters of
Robert de Vipont became sheriffs of Westmoreland upon their father's death because the
office of sheriff in that county was hereditary. Even this, however, is the exception that proves
the rule. Westmoreland was unusual, because it was one of only five hereditary shrievalties.
The daughters' husbands were also made sheriffs of Westmoreland, and a male deputy per-
formed the duties of the office. WILLIAM ALFRED MORRIS, THE MEDIEVAL SHERIFF TO 1300,
at 179-80 (1927); see also JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
530 (3rd ed. 1990). Similarly, there was one kind of jury-the "jury of matrons"-on which
women (and only women) could serve. This jury investigated whether women were pregnant in
order to determine either whether a widow was bearing her deceased husband's child or
whether a woman convicted of a capital crime was entitled to a stay of execution until the child
was born. See Judy M. Cornett, Hoodwink 'd by Custom: The Exclusion of Women from Juries
in Eighteenth-Century English Law and Literature, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 17-34
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positions as bishops or priests. Universities and guilds were similarly
exclusionary.'
Family was a key institution for both men and women, although
women's exclusion from many other institutions made the family
even more central for them. One area in which there was at least for-
mal equality was the formation of marriage. In contrast to customs
prevailing in the early middle ages, by the thirteenth century, canon
(ecclesiastical) law insisted that marriage required the free consent
of both husband and wife.'0 Nevertheless, there is substantial evi-
dence that women were often pressured, if not coerced, into mar-
riages arranged by their relatives."
Under canon law, both husband and wife had "equal rights to
marital sex."' 2 Each had an obligation to "respond to the sexual
needs of the other by paying the conjugal debt upon demand."' 3
While the law was formally equal, in practice the concept of conjugal
debt could justify something very close to marital rape. For example,
the pious Margery Kempe, unable at first to convince her husband to
live chastely, "complied" with his sexual demands only "with much
weeping and wailing that [she] could not live in chastity.""
During marriage, women were expected to be subordinate to their
husbands. Men could physically punish their wives, while a wife had
to rely on persuasion or on social or legal pressure to influence her
husband.'" Husbands controlled their wives' property, 6 and married
women could not bring lawsuits without joining their husbands as co-
(1997); James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 171-72
(1983).
9. BARBARA A. HANAWALT, "OF GOOD AND ILL REPUTE": GENDER AND SOCIAL CON-
TROL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 71 (1998).
10. Charles Donahue, Jr., The Canon Law on the Formation of Marriage and Social Prac-
tice in the Later Middle Ages, 8 J. FAM. HIST. 144 (1983).
11. R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 90-94 (1974);
HENRIETTA LEYSER, MEDIEVAL WOMEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WOMEN IN ENGLAND, 450-
1500, at 117-22 (1995).
12. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
358 (1987); see generally id at 93, 198, 358-60, 447.
13. Idat 198.
14. THE BOOK OF MARGERY KEMPE 32 (John Skinner trans., Image Books/Doubleday
1998) (1436).
15. HELMHOLZ, supra note 11, at 105-06 (Ecclesiastical courts would grant a divorce only
if husband inflicted severe and unjustified physical injury.); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 8, at 436 (Royal courts intervened only if husband maimed or killed his wife or if wife
feared "violence exceeding reasonable chastisement."); James A. Brundage, Domestic
Violence in Classical Canon Law, in VIOLENCE IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY 183-95 (Richard W.
Kaeuper ed., 2000); Jacqueline Murray, Thinking About Gender. The Diversity of Medieval
Perspectives, in POWER OF THE WEAK, supra note 5, at 1, 10.
16. Paul Brand, Family and Inheritance, Women and Children, in AN ILLUSTRATED HIS-
TORY OF LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 58, 65 (Chris Given-Wilson ed., 1996).
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plaintiffs. 7 Hemmed in by these and other restrictions, a married
woman was known as a feme covert (a woman "covered" by her
husband), and the legal regime governing married women was called
"coverture." Of course, the reality of marriage varied considerably
from couple to couple. No doubt there were many marriages in
which husbands treated their wives decently. And some wives, like
Chaucer's wife of Bath, surely managed to get the upper hand over
their husbands, in spite of prevailing institutions and norms.
Women's subordinate position was justified by the philosophy and
theology of the day. The most prominent thirteenth-century philo-
sopher and theologian, Thomas Aquinas, followed the Aristotelian
view that women were naturally inferior to men. Women were born
"defective," because "the active power in the seed of the male tends
to produce something like itself, perfect in masculinity; but the pro-
creation of a female is the result either of the debility of the active
power, or of some unsuitability of the material . . ."" This congeni-
tal defect meant that women were lesser in intellect as well as body.
As a result, "woman is by nature subject to man, because the power
of rational discernment is by nature stronger in man."" Eve's sin in
eating the forbidden fruit was also invoked to bolster men's
dominant position, as was Paul's admonition in his Letter to the
Ephesians: "Wives, be subject to your husbands as to the Lord; for
the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the
Church. As the church is subject to Christ, so let wives also be
subject in everything to their husbands."2 Other, less influential the-
ologians sometimes portrayed women in a better light, emphasizing
Paul's doctrine of spiritual equality: "There is neither Jew nor
Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor
female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. "
21
In spite of these beliefs and conditions, some women-especially
widows and nuns-managed to carve out some autonomy. While
widows were often impoverished, their husbands' deaths freed them
17. Unfortunately, there seems to have been little writing about this aspect of coverture in
the middle ages. Nevertheless, it appears that, at least in most circumstances, the rule was
applied. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 406, 408; Bennett, supra note 5, at 22-23;
Thomas Lund, Women in the Early Common Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1, 24-30. Books from
the early modern period treat the issue more comprehensively. See, e.g., A TREATISE OF
FEMES COVERTS OR THE LADY'S LAW 83-109 (Rotham Reprints 1974) (London, 1732). That
same treatise, however, makes an exception for appeals of rape. Id at 50.
18. 13 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 37 (Blackfriars eds. & trans., 1964) (Part
I, Question 92).
19. Id at 38.
20. Eph. 5:22-24.
21. Galatians 3:28. See Murray, supra note 15, at 1-26.
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from coverture" They thus had full legal control over their property
and full capacity to sue and be sued in their own name. Widows were
entitled to their dower, which was typically one third of their hus-
band's landed property.23 If the husband was sufficiently wealthy, the
dower could allow women to live independent lives. Similarly, by en-
tering the cloister, a woman could escape the inequality of marriage
and inhabit a world largely governed by other women. Nevertheless,
even an abbess's authority was frequently circumscribed by the ap-
pointment of a master or guardian.24
B. Legal Background and Two Sample Cases
In thirteenth-century England, crimes could be prosecuted in two
ways: by presentment and by appeal. Presentment was accusation by
a local jury and can be seen as an early form of public prosecution.
An appeal, on the other hand, was a private prosecution by the vic-
tim herself or, in homicide cases, by a relative of the victim. Unlike
modern appeals, these medieval appeals were not means of correct-
ing errors by lower courts. Rather, to appeal someone meant simply
to prosecute him for crime. 5 The prosecutor and defendant were
often called "appellor" and "appellee" respectively. Appeals were
initiated in county court, a local court held by the sheriff every four
weeks. According to custom and Magna Carta, however, the sheriff
could not try appeals, because they involved allegations of a breach
of the king's peace. Trial was therefore postponed to the general
eyre, a court held by royal justices as they traveled through the coun-
tryside every few years.26
Appeals could be brought for many offenses. In order of descend-
ing frequency, they were brought for assault (including beating,
wounding, and mayhem), homicide, theft, and rape. Appeals were
criminal prosecutions in that, if the prosecutor were successful, the
defendant was fined and the money went to the royal treasury rather
than to the victim. Sometimes, especially in homicide or theft cases,
22. Walker, supra note 2, at 3.
23. Janet Senderowitz Loengard, Rationabilis Dos: Magna Carta and the Widow's "Fair
Share" in the Earlier Thirteenth Century, in WIFE AND WIDOW IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND,
supra note 2, at 59.
24. JANET BURTON, MONASTIC AND RELIGIOUS ORDERS IN BRITAIN, 1000-1300, at 171
(1994).
25. For general information on appeals, see Klerman, supra note 7.
26. Some appeals, however, were heard in the central courts (King's Bench and Common
Bench), and in the second half of the thirteenth century it became common for appeals to be
heard by justices specially commissioned to hear particular cases. The eyre remained, however,
the place where most appeals were heard. See id at 31-33.
27. This ordering by frequency is based on the cases in the data set described in Part I.C.
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the defendant was hanged. Although appeals were classified as crim-
inal cases, to modern eyes they have at least one civil aspect. For
much of the thirteenth century, the prosecutor and accused could
settle. When they settled, the prosecutor would usually receive some
compensation for her injury.28 In addition, through skillful pleading,
most offenses prosecutable by appeal could be prosecuted in royal
court by a civil action of trespass or in local courts. Although this Ar-
ticle focuses on appeals, the role of women in these alternatives also
merits study.
The best way to understand women's appeals is to examine typical
cases. The first of two such cases was heard in the Bedfordshire eyre
in 1227:
Alan Parvus of Middletown slew Thomas Brekaspere and fled.
And he was in tithing at Middleton, and the tithing was amerced
at another time before the Justices; therefore nothing. His chat-
tels were of two shillings, whereof the Sheriff answers. Alan was
outlawed at the suit of Agnes wife of the said Thomas.29
Like most, this case provides little information about the parties or
the incident giving rise to the prosecution. In fact, the four lines
quoted above are the entirety of the surviving information about the
case. Nevertheless, the basic facts are clear. Agnes brought a private
prosecution against Alan Parvus, whom she accused of killing her
husband. Alan was summoned to court four times, but did not ap-
pear, because he had fled. As a result, he was outlawed, which meant
that it was illegal to give him food or shelter, and that he could be
killed without further legal process, if he resisted arrest. In addition,
an outlaw forfeited all his property to the king and his feudal lord.
The case mentions that Alan had two shillings in personal property,
for which the sheriff was responsible. Each male villager was requir-
ed to be in a "tithing," a group of approximately ten men who were
obligated to ensure that each appeared in court, if summoned. Since
Alan fled, his tithing failed in performing its duty and was "amer-
ced," that is, fined. Since they had already paid this fine, they were
recorded as owing nothing.
Fortunately, some cases are reported in greater detail. The case
below, from Kent in 1241, contains one of the fuller reports.
Gunora daughter of John Gronge appealed Geoffrey son of
William Broketherl that he forcibly lay with her and deflowered
28. For more on the settlement of appeals, see id. at 15-18.
29. ROLL OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE AT BEDFORD, 1227, case 372 (G. Herbert Fowler ed.
& trans., 3 Bedfordshire Historical Record Society 1916).
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her, etc. And Geoffrey comes and denies everything and puts
himself on the country [that is, pleads "not guilty" and submits
to jury trial]. And the jurors say that, in fact, the aforesaid Geof-
frey lay forcibly with the aforesaid Gunora and deflowered her,
because immediately afterwards she was seen by the headbor-
ough and by respectable men and women who saw that she was
sticky with blood and had been mistreated. Therefore let Geof-
frey be taken into custody. Later, the aforesaid Geoffrey comes
and with permission [of the court] gives the aforesaid Gunora
two acres of land in Mundham with their appurtenances. There-
fore the sheriff is ordered to cause her to have seisin [that is, le-
gal possession of the property]. And she retracts her appeal. She
is poor [and is therefore not fined for retracting her appeal].
And Geoffrey made fine for his amercement by four marks [that
is, promised to pay the king four marks] by sureties [names of
sureties omitted] .3
The report of this case is much fuller, and the facts revealed are
much more interesting. Gunora accused Geoffrey of rape. He ap-
peared for trial, and the jury found him guilty. The jury was persuad-
ed of his guilt because Gunora promptly reported the incident to the
relevant authority (the headborough), and the headborough deputiz-
ed men and women who examined her and found physical evidence
to corroborate her claim. Because of the jury verdict, the judges
ordered Geoffrey to be jailed, probably as a prelude to amercement
(fining). Sometime later, Geoffrey and Gunora settled the case.
Geoffrey gave Gunora two acres of land, and Gunora withdrew her
appeal. The judges instructed the sheriff to enforce the settlement.
Gunora would ordinarily have been fined for withdrawing from
prosecution, but the judges forgave her fine, because she was poor.
In spite of the settlement, Geoffrey still paid a fairly large fine (four
marks) to the king.
Although every case presents unique features, the two cases quot-
ed above are typical of most women's appeals. They involved homi-
cide and rape, the two crimes most often prosecuted by women, and
they resulted in outlawry and settlement, two of the most common
case resolutions. Although the first case is more typical in its ex-
tremely brief report, the greater detail in the second case sheds light
on actions and procedural steps which were probably common to
30. Public Record Office, JUST 1/359 m. 35d (transcription and translation by the author).
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many cases, but left unrecorded by the laconic style employed by
most judicial clerks.
Whether the prosecutor or the defendant in an appeal was ordinar-
ily represented by counsel is an important, but difficult issue.3' There
were two kinds of legal representatives in medieval England, plead-
ers and attorneys. Pleaders (known as serjeants or narrators) were
generally entrusted with speaking for the party. For a prosecutor, a
pleader would have spoken the count, that is, set forward the formal
words of the appeal. For a defendant, a pleader would have respond-
ed to the count by pleading defenses. Although a pleader spoke for a
party, his words could be disavowed by the party. By the 1220s or
1230s, there were a number of full-time, professional pleaders.32 Be-
fore that time, however, pleaders would have been non-profession-
als, perhaps friends or neighbors of the parties.33
An attorney's primary function was to appear for the party in
court, perhaps most importantly to prevent a default, to set in
motion the procedures to secure the defendant's presence, and to
seek default judgment if the defendant did not appear.34 While the
attorney did not usually make arguments to the court, whatever the
attorney did say bound the party. Unlike a pleader, an attorney
could not be disavowed. Professional attorneys are not clearly identi-
fiable until the late 1250s. Before that time, however, non-profes-
sionals often acted as attorneys. 5
It is clear that there were very few attorneys in appeals. Medieval
treatises flatly prohibit the use of attorneys in appeals unless the par-
ty herself was incapacitated, 6 and this rule seems to have been gen-
erally observed in practice. So, for example, to the extent that out-
lawry would have required an appellor to appear five times in court
31. On the thirteenth-century legal profession more generally, see PAUL BRAND, THE
ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION (1992). On the history of defense counsel, see
J.B. Post, The Admissibility of Defense Counsel in English Criminal Procedure, J. LEGAL
HIST., Dec. 1984, at 23.
32. BRAND, supra note 31, at 55.
33. Id; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 212.
34. BRAND, supra note 31, at 87.
35. Id. at 65.
36. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 353 (George E. Woodbine
ed. & Samuel. E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press.1968-77) ("And note that no one may sue
against another for felony by attorney, provided that he who complains and ought to sue is
able to do so himself; if he is temporarily incapacitated .... "); 1 BRITTON 101 (photo. reprint
1983) (Francis Morgan Nichols ed. & trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1865); PLACITA
CORONE OR LA CORONE PLEDI E DEVANT JUSTICES 1 (.M. Kaye ed. & trans., 4 Selden
Society Supplementary Series 1966) (" [L]et the plaintiff take care to make suit in county courts
fully and in person, for such is the custom and legal mode of procedure."). The prohibition on
attorneys in appeals was part of the more general rule against attorneys in cases in which a
party might be imprisoned. BRAND, supra note 31, at 45.
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss2/2
Klerman
to press her case, the female prosecutor would have had to appear
herself each time. She could not have sent an attorney to appear for
her. The case records usually indicate explicitly that the prosecutor
or defendant did or did not come to court, and they almost never
indicate that attorneys appeared for absent parties." The Placita
Corone, a mid-thirteenth-century treatise, provides some sample
courtroom dialogues which confirm that the parties were themselves
present in court. One dialogue involving a rape accusation is par-
ticularly pertinent. When the judge questioned the prosecutor, he
addressed her as "Girl," and she responded in the first person: "Sir,
if it please you, no matter what he says against me, I say openly that
he was the first man who ever made carnal approaches to me, and
did so wrongfully and against my free will."38 Similarly, the defendant
himself responded to the judge's queries. 9 The dialogues suggest no
role for an attorney in appeals.
It is less clear whether there were pleaders or serjeants in appeals.
The presence of pleaders is difficult to detect in the official legal
records which are the primary sources for this Article. Even in civil
cases, where pleaders were known to have been employed from the
early thirteenth century, their presence is not usually explicit, be-
cause the records attribute their words to the parties. Nevertheless,
there are three principal ways in which the presence of pleaders can
be detected: by judicial punishment of pleaders for misconduct, by
disavowals of their words, and through unofficial reports, which
usually indicate if a pleader spoke, often mentioning the pleader by
name.4" These methods make clear that pleaders were common in
37. I have found only two cases in which attorneys appeared for appellors, neither of them
women. 3 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, 1198-1212, pl. 725 (Doris Mary Stenton
ed., 83 Selden Society 1967) (Shropshire 1203); 6 CURIA REGIS ROLLS 392 (1932) (case from
1212). Although it is not apparent from the records, these cases may have involved appel-lors
who were incapacitated. They might, therefore, have been in accord with the general rule
forbidding attorneys in appeals.
38. PLACITA CORONE, supra note 36, at 9.
39. Id.; see also id. at 17 (forbidding defendant representation in appeals).
40. The treatises are not very helpful in determining whether pleaders were common in ap-
peals. Glanvill is silent on the issue. GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL (photo. reprint 1993) (G.D.G.
Hall ed. & trans., Nelson 1965). Bracton and Placita Corone are ambiguous. On the one hand,
they generally put the pleadings in the third person, which suggests that they were spoken by
someone other than the parties, that is, by a pleader or serjeant. 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at
416, 419; PLACITA CORONE, supra note 36, at 4-5, 7-8; BRAND, supra note 31, at 54. On the
other hand, the inference from the use of the third person to the employment of pleaders is
weak, because the Placita Corone explicitly bars pleaders for the defendant, even though its
pleading examples use the third person. PLACITA CORONE, supra note 36, at 17. But see David
J. Seipp, Crime in the Year Books, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 15, 25 (Chatal Stebbings
ed., 1995) (arguing that Placita Corone merely required the defendant to answer the charge,
but allowed lawyers to make arguments to the court). Most probably, the pleadings were in the
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civil cases from the early thirteenth century.4" In addition, some cases
from the 1290s suggest that serjeants were employed, at least occa-
sionally, in appeals.42 These cases come from the central courts, that
is, from King's Bench and Common Bench, which heard a relatively
small proportion of appeals.43 The implications of the evidence for
this Article are unclear, because the appeals examined here are from
the eyre in the period 1194-1294. Thus, the evidence of pleaders in
appeals comes from the very end of the period studied in this Article
and from different courts (the central courts rather than the eyre).
There is no evidence, neither from disavowals nor from lawyer dis-
cipline nor from the unofficial reports, that serjeants spoke for either
party in eyre appeals. On the other hand, disavowals and lawyer dis-
cipline were rare and few eyre reports survive, so it is possible that
there were some serjeants representing prosecutors or defendants in
the eyre, even though there is no evidence for it. Nevertheless, the
most plausible inference is that serjeants in eyre appeals were very
rare in the early thirteenth century and, at most, occasionally present
later in the century.
Although representation at trial seems to have been uncommon,
both sides might have consulted lawyers or local, non-professional
legal experts for advice before trial. In fact, because at least five
people from every village had to attend each eyre to participate in
the adjudication of appeals and other cases, it is likely that both
prosecutors and defendants would have been able to learn the basics
of the relevant procedures by consulting neighbors who had pre-
viously been involved in such cases.45
third person simply as a matter of convention. In civil cases, which were far more common
than appeals, serjeants had become common by the mid-thirteenth century, when Placita
Corone was written. As a result, it was conventional for pleadings to be put in the third person,
and that practice was probably carried over to appeals, even though serjeants may not have
been common. Britton explicitly states that serjeants were allowed in appeals, but does not in-
dicate how common they were. 1 BRITrON, supra note 36, at 10-02 (mentioning the possibility
that a serjeant might speak for an appellor or an appellee).
41. BRAND, supra note 31, at 47.
42. KB 27/148 m. 4 (King's Bench 1296) (noting that "John of Tilton prosecuted the afore-
said appeal in the name of the appellor as her serjeant"); British Library MS. Egerton 2811 ff.
100r-v (Common Bench 1297) (serjeants made arguments on behalf of both appellor and ap-
pellee); Y.B. 32-33 Edw. 192-95 (Easter 1304) (serjeants in King's Bench made arguments for
both appellor and appellee). For evidence of lawyers in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century ap-
peals, see Seipp, supra note 40, at 22-26.
43. Klerman, supra note 7, at 33.
44. This Article focuses on appeals in the eyre, because that is where most appeals were
heard. See supra note 26.
45. HANAWALT, supra note 9, at 128; Klerman, supra note 7, at 50.
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The cases used in this Article come from a data set compiled by
the author containing over one thousand two hundred appeals.46
Some of the cases have been printed and translated, while others
exist only in Latin, on parchment manuscripts stored in England's
Public Record Office. The next two pages contain pictures of one of
the manuscripts used in compiling the data set. The cases come from
select districts in fourteen English counties, ranging from Kent and
Wiltshire in the south, to Shropshire on the Welsh border, Norfolk
and Essex in east, and Yorkshire in the north. In the map following
the pictures, the counties whose records were used are shaded. The
districts included in the data set were chosen because a larger per-
centage of their records survive. Although the cases in the data set
are not a random sample of all thirteenth-century appeals, there is
no reason to suspect that the cases are in any way unrepresentative.
The survival of records for a particular district has more to do with
random factors-such as whether the judge transmitted his records
to the exchequer, as a 1257 order required, or whether moisture or
rats happened to damage records of a particular district-than fac-
tors plausibly correlated with women's appeals. The fact that the
database includes cases from every part of England and from the
entirety of the century also suggests that the cases are representative.
The use of such a large and representative database drawn from both
printed and unprinted sources allows for quantitative as well as
qualitative analysis of the issues raised by women's appeals and is
one of the factors which distinguishes this Article from prior analyses
of women's appeals.48
All cases analyzed were heard in the eyre, which was the principal
forum for appeals in the thirteenth century. Records from county
courts do not survive in sufficient numbers to allow quantitative
analysis of the preliminary stages of appeals. Those that do survive
are not very informative, and what information they do contain is
usually also available in the eyre records."
46. For a more detailed description of the data set, see Klerman, supra note 7, at 21-22, 61-
63.
47. DAVID CROOK, RECORDS OF THE GENERAL EYRE 12 (PRO Handbooks No. 20,
1982).
48. See, e.g., Meekings, supra note 4, at 123-25 (relying principally on records from a single
eyre in a single county); Orr, supra note 4, at 141 (relying exclusively on printed sources). For
an example of the pitfalls of relying on such a narrow base of source material, see infra note 51.
49. County court records were kept by the coroner. For more on the coroners' rolls and
their relationship to eyre records, see Klerman, supra note 7, at 63-64.
2002]
13
Klerman: Women Prosecutors in Thirteenth-Century England
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
284 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 14:271
~2 -
This is a copy of the A ..
man uscript from which the case ~
on page 286 was taken. The 4
document is made of parchment ... ,.,
and is just over two feet long and ,: ,
seven inches wide.
The case on page 286 is only - -•
oneof many cases visible on this
page. The next page reproduces, .-
in larger scale, the case on page .
286. The case begins at the spot
marked by an arrow. The next
page also contains a 
-.
transcription of the manuscript ., ,
by the author of this article.
z 7, .,<-'
--'-,  
, - " -" ., _. ., -:,o L
SA" .,, , ,l-+, - ,-" a , -, ,. l l
14






Klerman: Women Prosecutors in Thirteenth-Century England
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002








Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss2/2
2002] Klerman
II. DOCUMENTING AND EXPLAINING THE
PREVALENCE OF FEMALE PROSECUTORS
A. Crimes Prosecuted by Women
Using the data set described in Part I.C, it is possible to ascertain
the prevalence of women's appeals. Table 1 classifies appeals by the
sex of the prosecutor and by the offense alleged.
Table 1. Appeals by sex of prosecutor and offense, 1194-1294
Other All
Assaulta Homicide Theftb Rape crimesc crimes
Number of appeals 53 223 30 126 20 452
brought by women
Number of appeals 426 121 120 0 126 793
brought by men
Number of appeals 4 3 2 0 3 12
brought by woman
and man together
Percent of appeals 11% 65% 20% 100% 14% 36%
brought by women'
a. The assault column includes beating, wounding, and maiming.
b. The theft column includes larceny, robbery, and burglary, but excludes thefts com-
mitted in the course of other crimes. Such cases are counted in the column for the other crimes.
c. This column includes cases where the case record does not identify the crime.
d. In calculating the percentage of appeals brought by women, I have excluded appeals
brought by a woman and man together (the third row). Since the number of such appeals is so
small, inclusion would not alter the figures by more than one percent. In four cases, the sex of
the appellor could not be determined. These cases have been excluded from the table.
As the lower right-hand corner of the table indicates, women's
appeals constituted a sizable fraction (36%) of all appeals. Although
the role of women prosecutors has not been systematically studied in
other times and places, it appears that 36% is unusually high."
50. Procedural differences complicate comparison to other times and places. For example,
in early modern England, most crimes were prosecuted by indictment. In such cases, the victim
was not technically a party. Nevertheless, because such cases usually required considerable
victim initiative to secure a conviction, the victim in such cases is often referred to as a private
prosecutor. Douglas Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165,
167-70 (1983). In Staffordshire, during the years 1740-1800, only 6% of prosecutors were wom-
en. Id. at 168; Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder, Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850, in POLIC-
ING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 18 n.39 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder eds.,
1989). Women's participation in the prosecution of misdemeanors in late seventeenth-century
and early eighteenth-century Middlesex approached the numbers reported here for thirteenth-
century appeals. Women were responsible for 18.2% of all indictments and 34.9% of all non-
indicted recognizances in quarter sessions. ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, PROSECUTION AND PUN-
ISHMENT: PETTY CRIME AND THE LAW IN LONDON AND RURAL MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725, at
208 (1991). These percentages are only approximate, because in many cases the gender of the
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The first row of the table shows that women brought appeals for
all sorts of crimes. Their largest role was in rape and homicide.
Homicide appeals account for nearly half of all appeals brought by
women (49% or 223/452) and rape appeals account for more than a
quarter (28% or 126/452). Women brought appeals for other crimes,
including assault and theft, but as the table shows, such appeals were
less common.
The bottom row suggests that women's role in the prosecution of
homicide, the most serious felony, was especially noteworthy.
Women brought nearly two-thirds (65%) of all homicide appeals.5'
As would be expected in a system that presumed the victim would be
the appellor (except in homicide or other special cases52), all rape ap-
pellors were female. While women's role in prosecuting other crimes
(including batteries and thefts) was much smaller, it was still appreci-
able. The infrequent prosecution of batteries and thefts may reflect
legal prohibitions against such actions.53 The lower rate of appeals of
thefts also probably reflects the fact that married women could not
own chattels and that never-married women usually owned little.
The second-to-last row shows that a woman occasionally brought
an appeal together with a man (typically her husband). It is unclear
why appeals were brought in that form. One possibility is that such
appeals reflect coverture, the idea that a woman's legal personality
was suspended during marriage. One consequence of coverture was
that a married woman could not sue or be sued without her husband
being joined in the action. 4 As will be discussed below, this explana-
tion is not persuasive because the rule against married female appel-
lors seems to have been largely ignored, although it is possible that it
exerted some force even though under-enforced.
prosecutor could not be ascertained. In mid-fourteenth-century Florence, women seem to have
been responsible for only about 10% of all prosecutions, and that percentage dropped precipi-
tously as the century progressed. SAMUEL K. COHN, WOMEN IN THE STREETS: ESSAYS ON SEX
AND POWER IN RENAISSANCE ITALY 27, 33 (1996). (The percentage of female prosecutors was
calculated by dividing the number of female plaintiffs in Table 2.2 by the total number of
prosecutions in Table 2. 1.).
51. In his analysis of the 1235 Surrey eyre, C.A.F. Meekings noted that four out of seven
homicide appeals resulting in outlawry in county court were brought by women and that five
out of six homicide appeals heard in the eyre were brought by women. He thought "[s]uch a
preponderance of women's appeals.... not typical of appeals of homicide in the surviving
rolls .... " Meekings, supra note 4, at 120. Nevertheless, based on his figures, one can calculate
that 69% ((4+5)/(7+6)) of homicide appeals recorded in the 1235 Surrey eyre were brought by
women. This is within four percentage points of the figure I derived after looking at more than
fifty eyre rolls. Thus, contrary to Meekings's view, this preponderance of women's appeals was
indeed typical.
52. Seeinfrap.298.
53. See infra pp. 302-03.
54. See supra pp. 283-84.
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The cases in the table are only a small sample of all cases prose-
cuted by appeal. They were chosen because they come from districts
whose records survive with some abundance. Records for other
districts, however, survive only in more fragmentary form and were
not examined. Nevertheless, to appreciate the scope of women's
prosecution, it is helpful to have a rough sense of the total number of
women's appeals. I estimate that there were about 8000 appeals by
women during the period 1194-1294.55
Another way to contextualize the number of appeals by women is
to compare prosecutions by appeal and presentment. As mentioned
in the beginning of Part I.B, presentment was accusation by a local
jury. Homicide and theft were often presented. Although it is dif-
ficult to ascertain the relative frequency of appeal and presentment, I
have estimated that about one-third of all homicide prosecutions
were brought by appeal in the early thirteenth century, but that the
proportion dropped to about one-tenth by the end of the century.5"
Theft probably followed a similar pattern. Thus, if one calculated
women's homicide appeals as a fraction of all homicide prosecutions,
one would find that women prosecuted about 20% of homicides in
the beginning of the century, but less than 7% by the end. Similarly,
women's appeals would drop from about 7% of all theft prosecutions
at the turn of the century to about 2% by the end. Assault and rape,
however, were prosecuted in royal courts exclusively by appeal for
most of the century, 7 so the percentages in the bottom row of the
table for these crimes accurately describe women's appeals as a per-
centage of all prosecutions of these offenses.
55. This figure was calculated in three ways. First, I calculated the average number of ap-
peals per year per district in the database and multiplied that number times the total number
of districts. For enumeration of the districts, I relied on CROOK, supra note 47, at 196-252.
Second, using Domesday Book population figures, I calculated the rate of appeals per year per
person for the four counties for which I have data from nearly all districts and then multiplied
that rate times the entire population of England. H. C. DARBY, DOMESDAY ENGLAND 336
(1977) (figures from 1086). Third, I repeated the second calculation using population figures
from 1377 poll tax returns. JOSIAH COX RUSSELL, BRITISH MEDIEVAL POPULATION 132-46
(1948). The estimates produced by these three methods were remarkably similar, ranging from
8086 to 8260. These methods somewhat underestimate the total number of women's appeals
because they consider only appeals heard in the eyre, not appeals heard in the central courts,
in gaol delivery, or under special commissions.
56. See Klerman, supra note 7, at 57.
57. Rape was probably not presentable until the 1275 enactment of the first Statute of
Westminster. See Roger D. Groot, The Crime of Rape temp. Richard land John, 9 J. LEGAL.
HIST. 324, 325-26 (1988); Henry Ansgar Kelly, Statutes of Rapes and Alleged Ravishers of
Wives: A Context for the Charges Against Thomas Malory, Knight, 28 VIATOR 363, 364-66,
382-83, 387-88 (1997); J. B. Post, Ravishment of Women and the Statutes of Westminster, in
LEGAL RECORDS AND THE HISTORIAN 150, 154-55 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978). Even after 1275,
rape presentments were rare.
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B. Why Did Women Bring So Many Appeals?
The previous section suggests that women brought over a third of
all private prosecutions. The prevalence of women's appeals is a
phenomenon that requires explanation. I suggest five reasons.
1) Women were often victims of crime, and the legal rules govern-
ing appeals tended to restrict prosecution to the victim herself. Con-
temporary legal treatises note that the appellor must have been an
eyewitness to the crime. She must "speak of her own sight and hear-
ing."58 For most crimes, the victim was the most likely and often the
only eyewitness. In addition, Bracton says that, except in extraordin-
ary circumstances, only the victim herself (or relatives in the case of
homicide) can bring appeals." Since women were often victims of
crime, they would frequently have been the only individuals legally
qualified to appeal.
Explaining the high rate of women's appeals by the legal rules that
restricted suits to victims is problematic, however, because those
rules may not have been enforced. I have seen no case in which a
defendant objected to an appeal because the appellor was not the
victim, and only infrequently did the defendant allege that the appel-
lor did not speak "of sight and hearing."6 While it is possible that
such objections were rare because the rules were seldom violated,
the evidence regarding other defenses suggests that one cannot infer
conformity to law from the absence of objection.6' Defendants, who
were not ordinarily represented by counsel, probably lacked the
legal knowledge and sophistication to raise such technical objections
even when they were applicable.
Using the eyewitness rule to explain the substantial rate of pro-
secutions by women is also problematic because it cannot explain the
fact that women brought two-thirds of the homicide prosecutions.
While it is possible that women were twice as likely to witness
homicides as male relatives, this suggestion seems implausible."
58. 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 397 ("Item cadit appellum ubi appellans non loquitur de
visu et auditu.").
59. Id. at 398-99, 413.
60. JUST 1/358 m. 22 (Kent 1227) (Appellee in homicide case claimed that appellor did
not mention sight and hearing in his appeal, but the judges did not address this issue and the
appeal was quashed for other reasons.); JUST 1/62 m. 1 (Buckinghamshire 1232) (Appellor did
not want to prosecute homicide case because he could not plead that he had been an eye-
witness.); JUST 1/359 m. 32d (Kent 1241) (Homicide appeal quashed because appellor did not
plead that she was eyewitness.).
61. See infra pp. 305-06.
62. At least one historian has suggested that the eyewitness rule did not apply in homicide
cases. WILLIAM SHARP MCKETCHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 452 (2d ed. 1958). There is some evidence for this in Glanvill, but the
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2) A more plausible explanation for women's dominant role in
prosecuting homicide is that, unlike most men, women who brought
appeals did not risk trial by battle. When a case was tried by battle,
the outcome hinged on personal combat between prosecutor and de-
fendant. Although the overwhelming majority of appeals were tried
by jury, trial by battle was often a possibility. 3 A male appellor was
required to offer proof by battle. Before 1215, the appellee could
choose either trial by battle or trial by ordeal. 4 After 1215, jury trial
replaced the ordeals. If the appellee opted to defend by battle, the
appellor's life was in danger. Female appellors, however, never
waged battle. Those accused by women had to submit either to the
ordeal (before 1215) or to jury trial (after 1215). Since the rule re-
stricting appeals to eyewitnesses seems not to have been enforced, in
practice it seems likely that any relative could appeal, and thus that
there were often several potential appellors-husband, wife, mother,
father, sister, brother, niece, nephew, aunt, uncle, etc.6" Homicide
formulae set out by Bracton require appellors to allege and swear that they saw the homicide.
GLANVILL, supra note 40, at 174; 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 388, 399; see also id at 397.
While it is possible that everyone understood the eyewitness requirement to be a formality, as
seems to have been the case with champions in land cases, there is no evidence to support this
conjecture. In fact, the cases in which I have seen the eyewitness rule invoked were all
homicide appeals. See supra note 60.
63. Defendants in a small but significant number of cases claimed their right to trial by bat-
tle. In nearly all of those cases, the prosecutor then withdrew or settled the case. See Meekings,
supra note 4, at 116 (finding trial by battle to have been scheduled in about 1% of cases-fif-
teen out of "well over a thousand"-in the period 1234-49). Only very rarely was battle fought.
Id. (finding no battles fought in non-approver appeals during the period 1234-49). But see
JUST 1/358 m. 20 (Kent 1227) (battle fought and won by defendant in mayhem appeal). The
fact that prosecutors nearly always withdrew or settled if defendants claimed trial by battle
suggests that prosecutors greatly feared trial by battle. The small number of cases in which
battle was waged can probably be explained by two facts: (1) potential prosecutors who feared
that they would lose in trial by battle did not appeal at all, and (2) defendants who feared that
they would lose in trial by battle chose trial by jury. These facts suggest that even though trial
by battle was rare, fear of battle may have influenced the decisions of defendants and potential
prosecutors in many cases.
64. The most common ordeal was the ordeal of cold water, in which the defendant was
bound and thrown into a pool of water. If he sank, he was pulled out of the water and declared
innocent. If he floated, he was guilty and hanged. See Margaret H. Kerr et al., Cold Water and
Hot Iron: Trial by Ordeal in England, 22 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 573, 582-83 (1992). On the signif-
icance of 1215 and the end of ordeals, see infra p. 306. In this Article, I generally refer to de-
fendants as males because the overwhelming majority of thirteenth-century defendants were in
fact male. For a discussion of female defendants, see JAMES GIVEN, SOCIETY AND HOMICIDE
IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 135-49 (1977); Hanawalt, supra note 3, at 125.
65. Britton, a treatise written in the early 1290s, asserts that only the wife or the "the male
nearest in blood" can appeal. 1 BRITTON, supra note 36, at 109, 111, 114. Although this formu-
lation implies that the right to appeal was not available to any kinsman, it still meant that there
were two potential appellors in most cases, the wife and the nearest male relative. I have found
only one thirteenth-century case mentioning the idea that the nearest relative alone could ap-
peal. STATE TRIALS OF THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST, 1289-1293, at 81 (T.F.T. Tout &
Hilda Johnstone eds., 1906) (appeal quashed because homicide victim had "brothers who were
closer in blood [than the appellor] and sisters"). But see Y.B. 32-33 Edw. 192-93 (Easter 1304)
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thus presented the deceased's family with substantial choice. That
nearly two-thirds of homicide appeals were prosecuted by the wife or
other female relative, thus, most likely reflects the fact that a wom-
an's appeal would spare male relatives the peril of trial by battle.
When a family had already had one member killed by the defendant,
it would have been understandably reluctant to put another member
at risk in judicial combat. The fact that married women sometimes
brought appeals for their husbands' injuries" and for property that
legally belonged to their spouse 7 may also reflect women's immunity
from the peril of battle.
The value of immunity from the battle declined, however, in the
late thirteenth century because judges put defendants to jury trial "at
the king's suit" even when the appellor had dropped the case." This
policy effectively gave male appellors the same immunity from battle
as women. If a man had appealed and then dropped the prosecution
he could avoid battle while nearly guaranteeing that the defendant
would be put on trial. Even so, women retained three advantages.
First, to avoid battle, a man would have to drop his prosecution, and
thus would be fined, whereas a woman could avoid a battle even if
she pursued her case to judgment. Second, while nearly all late-
thirteenth-century non-prosecuted appellees were put to the jury,
such defendants were sometimes, for reasons that are not clear, let
off without trial. Thus, a dropped prosecution by a male prosecutor
might not be as effective as a woman's appeal. Finally, it was some-
times said that sanctions at "the king's suit" after a dropped appeal
were not as harsh as the sanctions that would have been imposed if
(defendant's argument that the eldest son should appeal the death of his father was rejected,
because "farthest off in blood can prosecute the appeal in default of one nearer in blood"). It is
also notable that Britton, the treatise asserting the rule, was written at the very end of the
period studied in this Article. Bracton, a treatise written principally in the late 1220s and early
1230s, does not contain any such restriction, except in an interpolation relating to the situation
where several relatives simultaneously appealed. Bracton says that "the nearer kinsman is
always preferred to the more remote." 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 352. Nevertheless, even
this formulation left the family free to choose a more remote relative as appellor, as long as the
closer relative did not also appeal. The 1304 case cited above supports that interpretation. In
addition, it is not clear what Bracton meant by "preferr[ing]" the closer relative. For example,
unlike Britton, Bracton does not say that an appeal can be quashed if it was made by a remote
relative when a close relative was alive. Compare 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 399 with
BRITTON, supra note 36, at 111.
66. See infra Table 2.
67. THE EARLIEST NORTHAMPTONSHIRE ASSIZE ROLLS, A.D. 1202 AND 1203, at 70
(Doris M. Stenton ed., 5 Northamptonshire Record Society 1930); JUST 1/358 m. 21d (Kent
1227); JUST 1/4 m. 29d (Bedfordshire 1247); JUST 1/232 m. 10d (Essex 1248); THREE ROLLS
OF THE KING'S COURT IN THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD THE FIRST, A.D. 1194-1195, at 91
(Frederic William Maitland ed., 14 Pipe Roll Society 1891).
68. See Klerman, supra note 7, at 38-40; see also discussion infra pp. 306-08.
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the case had been diligently prosecuted. 9 If so, this difference would
mean that female appellors possessed an additional advantage.
3) Over half of all homicide appeals were widows prosecuting
those allegedly responsible for their husbands' death. This phenom-
enon may stem from a norm or custom that a wife prosecute her hus-
band's murderer. That treatises, cases, and Magna Carta explicitly
allow appeals in this situation 0 probably reflects that custom. This
explanation and the previous one-women's immunity from battle-
may have been related. No thirteenth-century source barred male
relatives from appealing the death of a married man.' The custom
that widows prosecute those responsible for the deaths of their hus-
band may have arisen because the widow, as a woman, was immune
from battle.
4) Rape prosecutions constitute over a quarter of all women's
appeals. In later centuries, the often humiliating nature of rape trials
discouraged such prosecution. Women usually had to describe the
rape publicly in shameful detail, and defendants often were allowed
to introduce evidence of the woman's sexual history and reputation. 2
The nature of thirteenth-century jury trial may have curbed these
disincentives. The jury was "self-informing," that is, it was expected
to have gathered its evidence before trial.73 As a result, trial did not
usually involve the testimony (much less cross-examination) of the
victim/prosecutor.74 Thus, the trial of a rape appeal would not have
subjected the rape victim to potentially shameful examination. As
69. Bracton reports that some people thought that capital punishment was not possible on
the king's suit, although the treatise seems to side with the view that it was possible. 2
BRACTON, supra note 36, at 403. Placita Corone is contradictory on the subject. In some places
it seems to agree with the position that capital punishment was not possible on the king's suit.
PLACITA CORONE, supra note 36, at 2, 3, 27. But in other places, the treatise insists on full
punishment. For example, in discussing the king's suit after a quashed rape appeal, it insists
upon the "judgment appropriate to the case; that is to say he will be blinded or castrated or
both." Id at 9. Similarly, in discussing the king's after a quashed woman's homicide appeal, the
treatise insists on "full judgment," which may mean capital punishment. Id. at 6, 28.
70. See infra pp. 302-03.
71. Some fourteenth-century sources, however, suggest that male relatives could not ap-
peal when the widow was still alive. See Lincoln's Inn MS Misc. 738, fol. 20v; Cambridge Uni-
versity Library MS LI.4.17, fols. 219r-v; Susanne Jenks, Occidit.. Inter Brachia Sua: Change in
a Woman s Appeal ofMurder of Her Husband, 21 J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (2000).
72. Laurie Edelstein, An Accusation Easily to be Made? Rape and Malicious Prosecution
in Eighteenth-Century England, 42 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 351, 364-66 (1998).
73. See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing in THE TRIAL IN HISTORY
(Maureen Mulholland & Brian Pullan eds., forthcoming) (noting debate about the nature of
thirteenth-century jury trial, but concluding that the jury was self-informing).
74. Vigorous cross-examination did not become routine in criminal cases until the
eighteenth-century. See John Langbein, Criminal TrialBefore the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 282-83, 312 (1978). Even those who doubt that the jury was self-informing do not believe
that medieval witnesses were rigorously cross-examined.
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the dialogue from the Placita Corone quoted above indicates,75 the
judge might question the appellor, but this questioning did not dwell
on the potentially shameful and embarrassing details of the rape. On
the other hand, although the sources are silent on the matter, the ac-
cusation itself and the jury's out-of-court investigation undoubtedly
brought some shame on the victim/prosecutor. Nevertheless, since
the jury's investigation was less public, the negative consequences for
the prosecutor may have been less severe. In fact, Barbara Hanawalt
suggests that even when a rape prosecution resulted in acquittal, the
"satisfaction [of] tell[ing] the tale and nam[ing] the culprit" may have
outweighed the danger to the woman's own reputation.
5) Finally, appeals by a woman for her husband's injuries and for
crimes against her husband's property may also reflect a woman's
role as her husband's agent in household and legal affairs when the
husband was engaged in other business, such as war or harvest."
C The Ineffectiveness of Restrictions on Women's Appeals
The large fraction of appeals women brought is especially sur-
prising in light of customary rules restricting women's ability to bring
criminal prosecutions. A woman could bring an appeal only for rape,
for the death of her husband, and perhaps for assaults to her own
person." These customary rules were set out in the earliest treatises
on law in the royal courts-the late-twelfth-century treatise attrib-
uted to Glanvill and the early-thirteenth-century treatise attributed
to Bracton-and enforced whenever invoked by the defendant. The
only ambiguity relates to appeals of assault. Most formulations of the
rule restricting women's appeals stated that women could appeal
only for "injury to her body" (iniuria corpori suo inflicta) or for her
75. See supra p. 289.
76. HANAWALT, supra note 9, at 133.
77. Archer, supra note 2, at 149. See also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 482
(noting that "a woman will sometimes appear as her husband's attorney").
78. Some sources also suggest that a woman could bring an appeal for the death of her un-
born child and for theft or robbery, at least where the thief was arrested with the stolen goods.
ROYAL JUSTICE AND THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH COUNTRYSIDE: THE HUNTINGDONSHIRE
EYRE OF 1286, THE RAMSEY ABBEY BANLIEU COURT OF 1287, AND THE ASSIZES OF 1287-88,
pl. 370 (A.R. & E.B. DeWindt eds., 1981); G.O. Sayles, Introduction to 3 SELECT CASES IN
THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD I, at lxxii-lxxiii (G.O. Sayles ed., 58 Selden
Society 1939); British Library MS Egerton 2811 fols. 81r, 100r; British Library MS Stowe 386
fol. 154r; Cambridge University Library MS Ee.6.18 fol. 7v-8r (allowing women to appeal
robbery generally, but not death of unborn child). But see BRITTON, supra note 36, at 114
(denying women's ability to appeal for the death of an unborn child).
79. GLANVILL, supra note 40, at 174, 176; 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 419. For enforce-
ment, see cases cited in the next four footnotes. For a good discussion of these restrictions, see
G.O. Sayles, supra note 78, at lxxii-lxxiv.
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husband's death." Although the phrase "injury to her body" could
simply be a euphemism for rape, the literal meaning would suggest
that a woman was permitted to appeal assaults when she was the
victim.' On the other hand, the rule was sometimes formulated as
allowing appeals only for rape and her husband's death. 2 One conse-
quence of either interpretation of the rule was that a widow was not
supposed to bring an appeal for theft or burglary of her own
property, which meant that no one was permitted to appeal such
crimes. Although I have found only one case raising the legality of
such appeals, it ruled against the widow. Although no one could
appeal such cases, they could still be prosecuted by presentment.84
Magna Carta (1215) also had a provision restricting women's
appeals:
No one shall be taken or imprisoned upon the appeal of a
woman for the death of anyone except her husband. 5
Most modern commentators interpret this provision as affirming the
part of the customary rule that restricted women's homicide appeals
to instances where the deceased was her husband. Some thirteenth
century cases also interpreted the provision in this way.87 Never-
theless, the more plausible explanation is that Magna Carta sought to
clarify the pretrial implications of the customary rule. The customary
rule simply said that women could not appeal except in narrow
circumstances, but it left open what the accused's remedy would be.
There were two possibilities. The customary rule could mean only
that the defendant had a valid defense at trial but that pretrial
80. GLANVILL, supra note 40, at 174, 176; 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 353, 419; JUST
1/361 m. 42 (Kent 1255).
81. This implication is clear from Glanvill, which states that women can make rape appeals
"just as in every case of injury done to her body." GLANVILL, supra note 40, at 176.
82. JUST 1/55 m. 21d (Buckinghamshire 1241).
83. THE ROLL OF THE SHROPSHIRE EYRE OF 1256, pl. 566 (Alan Harding ed., 96 Selden
Society 1981).
84. See supra pp. 285, 297. Note, however, that if the customary rule was interpreted to bar
women's appeal of assault, not only could no one appeal assaults to a woman (except perhaps
her husband), but such offenses could not be prosecuted by presentment either, because there
was no presentment for assault (at least not in royal court). It is possible, however, that such
cases could be prosecuted in local courts. Also, from the mid-thirteenth century, the woman
could bring a civil trespass action. See Klerman, supra note 7, at 44.
85. J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 466-67 (2nd ed. 1992) (Magna Carta, c. 54).
86. J.C. HOLT, Magna Carta and the Origins of Statute Law, in POSTSCRIPTA: ESSAYS ON
MEDIEVAL LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN STATE IN HONOR OF GAINES
POST, 15 STUDIA GRATIANA 489, 497 n.23 (1972). Butsee Meekings, supra note 4, at 124.
87. 1 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD 1 90 (G.O. Sayles
ed., 55 Selden Society 1936); 2 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER ED-
WARD I 25 (G.O. Sayles ed., 57 Selden Society 1938); JUST 1/13 m. 22 (Bedfordshire 1287).
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process (arrest, imprisonment, etc.) would be unaffected by the rule.
Alternatively, the customary rule could mean that sheriffs, who were
primarily responsible for pretrial process, should refuse even to ar-
rest and imprison those accused by improper appeals. Magna Carta
may have clarified this ambiguity by instructing the sheriff not to
arrest ("take") or imprison when the appeal violated the customary
rule.88 This interpretation also explains why Magna Carta refers only
to the homicide part of the customary rule restricting women's ap-
peals. Homicide was the only crime for which defendants were rou-
tinely arrested and imprisoned. For other crimes, the defendant was
merely attached, that is, was left at liberty if he could find sureties.
Since the pretrial consequences of other forbidden appeals were so
slight, Magna Carta addressed only homicide.
The reason for these restrictions on women's appeals has never
been satisfactorily elucidated. Most commentators suggest that they
reflect the advantage that female appellors derived from their
exemption from trial by battle. Whereas men might be deterred from
bringing appeals by fear of battle, women could bring appeals with
impunity, confident that at worst they would be fined for false pro-
secution. The restriction on women's appeals could be seen as a way,
albeit a rather crude one, to reduce abusive appeals.89 R.H. Helmholz
has suggested that these restrictions were unrelated to women's
88. A 1275 Bedfordshire coroner's roll affords a rare glimpse of the effect of Magna Carta
on pre-trial process. A man accused of homicide was about to be outlawed by a woman who
was appealing the death of her brother. The sheriff, however, received a royal writ (procured
by the appellee?) ordering "that all the enactments of the Great Charter be observed." As a
result, the county court did not proclaim the appellee's outlawry. SELECT CASES FROM THE
CORONERS' ROLLS 35 (Charles Gross ed., 9 Selden Society 1895). Note, however, that Magna
Carta does not explicitly address the propriety of outlawry in this situation and that Bracton
and the Placita Corone suggest that outlawry would be appropriate, even though the woman's
appeal was forbidden. 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 353 ("a suit is valid no matter by whom
brought, and for an indefinite time, when there is no one to except against him who sues");
PLACITA CORONE, supra note 36, at 9 (woman's appeal forbidden by Magna Carta sufficient
for outlawry, because "his recalcitrance indicates that he is guilty of the deed for which she ap-
peals him."); id. at 29. A 1286 Huntingdonshire case provides another glimpse of the effect of
Magna Carta on pre-trial process. The county was amerced, "because it admitted this appeal
by a mother for the death of her son contrary to the form and tenor of our lord king's Magna
Carta." ROYAL JUSTICE AND THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH COUNTRYSIDE: THE HUNTINGDON-
SHIRE EYRE OF 1286, THE RAMSEY ABBEY BANLIEU COURT OF 1287, AND THE ASSIZES OF
1287-88, supra note 78, pl. 370. Unfortunately, it isn't clear whether the county court arrested
or imprisoned the appellee, or whether it simply allowed the woman to plead.
89. MCKETCHNIE, supra note 62, at 451 (but note that McKetchnie erroneously assumes
that women could hire champions to fight for them); Meekings, supra note 4, at 123-24; British
Library Egerton MS 2811 f. 100r ("And the reason that a woman's appeal ought not be main-
tained in such a case is... that a man will not have the same advantage of defending by his
body [i.e. by battle] in an appeal against a woman as he would have against a man."). The same
manuscript also mentions that women's appeals were restricted because women are of change-
able disposition ("femes sount chaungables de corage"). Id.
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immunity from battle, but instead mimicked similar provisions in
Roman and canon law. 90
Although it is difficult to understand why the law restricted wom-
en's appeals, it is clear that the restrictions were ineffective. 9 Table 2
classifies appeals by crime and the relationship between the appellor
and crime victim. Appeals forbidden by the customary rules are
shaded. Although assault appeals in which the female appellor was
the victim may have been forbidden, because of the ambiguity re-
garding the legality of this category, the relevant cell was not shaded.
Table 2. Women's appeals by offense and appellor's relation to victim,
1194-1294
Other
Assault Homicide Theft Rape crimes
a All
crimes
Woman appeals injury 9% 0% 20% 100%' 14% 17%
to self
Woman appeals injury 2% 51% 0% 0%' 2% 15%
to husband
Woman appeals injury 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 4%
to other relative
All appeals by women 11% 65% 20% 100% 16% 36%
a. This column excludes cases in which the crime was not specified and so differs some-
what from the column labeled "Other crimes" in Table 1.
While the two principal categories of women's appeals-rape and
death of husband-did not run afoul of the customary prohibitions,
many women's appeals did. As Table 2 shows, 14% of all homicide
appeals were brought by women prosecuting those whom they
thought killed someone other than their husband. Similarly, 20% of
theft appeals were brought by women, although such appeals were
not within the permitted categories. Eleven percent of assault ap-
peals were brought by women, of which most (appeals by women for
injuries to themselves) were of ambiguous legality, and some (ap-
peals for injuries to husbands) were clearly forbidden. The miscel-
laneous other appeals, including prosecutions for crimes such as
arson and false imprisonment, were also forbidden to women, who
nevertheless brought 16% of them. In all, forbidden appeals con-
stituted 22% or 31% of all appeals brought by women, depending on
whether one classifies cases in which a woman appealed an assault
against herself as legal or illegal.
90. R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 350-52
(1999).
91. See Meekings, supra note 4, at 125; Orr, supra note 4, at 141.
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Why were the restrictions so ineffective? The most important
reason was probably that appellees were not ordinarily represented
by counsel. Like modern criminal suspects, medieval appellees were
generally unfamiliar with their rights and so failed to raise valid
defenses. Nor were the judges inclined to inform them of their rights.
As Bracton notes, "it is not for the king's court to show him [the
appellee] how he ought to make his defence."92 Thus, even when an
appeal clearly violated the rules regarding women's appeals, judges
sent it to jury trial unless the defendant objected. In theory, early
modern judges provided legal counsel to defendants, but this was
clearly not the case in the thirteenth century. As a result, in most
cases, the legal restrictions on women's appeals were ineffective on
account of the ignorance of defendants and the indifference of
judges."
Another reason was judicial treatment of quashed appeals. Appel-
lees did occasionally raise the customary restrictions as defenses. In
such cases, the judges nearly always accepted the defense and de-
clared the appeal "null."94 Before 1215, when ordeals were the prin-
cipal method of proof, the defendant in a quashed appeal was ordin-
arily acquitted. As a result of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215,
however, the criminal justice system was forced to abandon ordeals,
and jury trial swiftly became the norm. Soon thereafter, judges took
advantage of the presence of a jury ready to decide the case and put
defendants to trial even when the appeal had been declared "null."
That is, starting in the 1220s, a quashed appeal no longer acquitted
the appellee. The judges, "in order to preserve the king's peace," put
the question of the defendant's innocence to the jury, just as they
would have done if the appeal had not been quashed.95 Thus, al-
though women technically lacked the legal power to bring certain
appeals, their quashed appeals were sufficient to force the appellees
to jury trial. The following case, from Shropshire in 1256, shows how
the procedure worked:
Agnes, who was the wife of Warin of Tedstill appealed Thomas
Hord, William of Pimley, clerk, Walter Walhop, Philip Hord,
Philip Caloch, Stephen of Stocks, Richard of Brugeshull and
92. 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 390; see also supra note 88 (discussing outlawry based on
forbidden appeals).
93. Historians of later periods have also noted that lack of representation usually led to
under-enforcement of rights. See, e.g., J.S. Cockburn, Trial by the Book? Fact and Theory in
the Criminal Process: 1558-1625, in LEGAL RECORDS AND THE HISTORIAN, supra note 57, at
60.
94. See cases cited supra notes 80, 82, 83.
95. PLACITA CORONE, supra note 36, at 26; see Orr, supra note 4, at 141, 153.
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss2/2
Klerman
Ralph of Roughton in the shire-court [alleging] that when she
was in the peace of the Lord king in her house at Tedstill on the
Wednesday of Easter week in the 37th year [of King Henry III],
Thomas and the others came about the middle of the night and
tried to break into her house against the peace etc. This she
offers etc. Walter Walhop, Philip Caloch, Stephen of Stocks and
Richard of Brugeshull have not come. [Their sureties are fined.]
Thomas Hord, Philip Hord and Ralph of Roughton come and
deny the breaking-in and everything, and they ask it to be award
to them that Agnes is a woman and has an appeal in two situ-
ations only. So it is decided that the appeal is null. William of
Pimley comes and says that he is a clerk and ought not to answer
here. On this the dean of the bishop of Coventry and Lichfield
comes and claims him as a clerk and William is delivered to him.
But that it may be known in what condition he is handed over,
let the truth be inquired of the country. Verdict: Thomas and
the others came by night to the house of said Agnes and broke
into it, but not feloniously or to commit any robbery, but to take
seisin. But since they did it at night and against the statutes of
the Realm, they are to be committed to gaol. Afterwards,
Thomas Hord, Philip Hord and Ralph of Roughton made fine at
40 shillings.... 96
Because the case involved eight defendants, it is somewhat more
complicated than usual. Four did not show up for trial, and their
sureties were fined. A fifth was a cleric and successfully claimed
"benefit of clergy." That is, as a cleric, he was immune from secular
justice. The remaining three-Thomas Hord, Philip Hord, and Ralph
of Roughton-are the defendants of principal interest for this
Article. They came to the eyre and defended themselves both by
denying the crime (burglary or, perhaps, attempted burglary) and by
arguing that Agnes's appeal violated the customary rules restricting
women's appeals. They asserted that "Agnes is a woman and has an
appeal in two situations only," that is, only for rape (or perhaps
injuries to her body generally) and the death of her husband. The
court accepted this defense and declared the appeal to be null, but
did not acquit the defendants. Rather, the judges "let the truth be
inquired of the country." That is, they sent the case to trial by jury,
"at the king's suit." The reason recorded for sending the case to
trial-" that it be known in what condition he is handed over"-per-
tained only to William of Pimley, the clerical defendant. Never-
96. THE ROLL OF THE SHROPSHIRE EYRE OF 1256, supra note 83, pl. 566 (All material in
square brackets was placed there by Harding, except "Their sureties are fined.").
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theless, it is clear that the jury was asked to render a verdict on all
defendants. Other cases make clear that the reason for this practice
was to "preserve the king's peace.91 7 The jury's verdict partially in-
criminated and partially exonerated the defendants. They had viola-
ted the law by breaking into Agnes's home at night, but their actions
were not a felony, because their intent was "to take seisin," not to
steal. Presumably they were acting in accordance with a prior court
judgment depriving Agnes of possession and/or ownership of the
house. Because the defendants' actions were unlawful they were or-
dered committed to jail. As was normal in such situations, however,
the defendants avoided imprisonment by paying a fine. Thus, even
though Agnes's appeal was quashed, the defendants were tried and
punished.
By prosecuting defendants "at the king's suit" when women had
brought appeals prohibited by custom, judges effectively nullified
those restrictions in the interest of public order. This policy was part
of a larger judicial practice of ensuring that all defendants appealed
of crime went to trial, even if the appeal was quashed or the appellor
failed to prosecute. The explicit reason for this policy was to "pre-
serve the king's peace," that is to punish and deter malefactors.
These two practices-ignoring defenses if not raised by the defen-
dant and putting defendants to trial at the king's suit when defenses
were successfully raised-suggest that late thirteenth-century judges
took a remarkably "deserts-oriented" approach to their criminal
docket. They seem to have been impatient with technical rules and
used their power to ensure that outcomes reflected jury verdicts on
guilt or innocence, rather than legal niceties. To the extent that
women's appeals were especially encumbered with legal restrictions,
these judicial practices enhanced women's ability to prosecute.
III. THE OUTCOMES OF WOMEN'S APPEALS
Women prosecutors were reasonably successful in settling their
cases and in the judgments they obtained in court. They settled more
of their cases than men and obtained favorable jury verdicts about as
often.
Determining the exact percentage of cases settled is difficult be-
cause it is often impossible to ascertain whether there was settle-
ment. Settlements were most likely in non-prosecuted cases, but
appellors may have stopped prosecuting for many reasons other than
settlement, including recognition that they were likely to lose the
97. Id., pls. 567, 613, 621, 747, 811, 890.
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case or extra-legal pressure to drop it. Nevertheless, in many non-
prosecuted cases the records indicate whether there was settlement.
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that cases prosecuted to trial
or resulting in outlawry were not settled. Using these cases, it is
possible to calculate the approximate settlement rate. Because of the
missing data, these figures probably underestimate the fraction of
cases that settled and should be regarded with caution. Table 3,
below, breaks down settlement rates by offense and by the sex of the
prosecutor.
Table 3. Settlement by sex of prosecutor and offense, 1194-1294
Other All
Assault Homicide Theft Rape crimes' crimes
Male prosecutor, 101 3 15 0 19 138
settled
Male prosecutor, 186 81 37 0 35 339
not settled
Female prosecutor, 14 9 4 35 4 66
settled
Female prosecutor, 17 119 8 27 7 178
not settled
Male prosecutor, 35% 4% 29% 35% 29%
% settled
Female prosecutor, 45% 7% 33% 56% 36% 27%
% settled
a. This column includes cases where the case record does not identify the crime.
If one looked merely at the overall percentages, it would seem that
settlement rates were nearly identical. The percentages in the lower
right-hand corner are nearly identical: 29% of male prosecutors
settled versus 27% of women. Nevertheless, when one looks at each
offense separately, women settled more often. Female prosecutors
settled 45% of all assault appeals, while male prosecutors settled
only 35%. For other offenses, the differences are not as large, but
women still settled more. That women settled a greater percentage
of appeals of each offense, but slightly less overall is somewhat para-
doxical. The apparent contradiction, however, is explicable by the
fact that women brought proportionately more homicide appeals.
Even though female prosecutors settled more of those cases than
men, their settlement rate was still under ten percent. This predom-
inance of homicide appeals reduces the overall percentage of cases
settled by female appellors.
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Unfortunately, the terms of settlements are not generally known,
and without that knowledge, it is hard to interpret the differences be-
tween male and female settlement rates. The greater settlement rate
might reflect the fact that women were in a weaker bargaining posi-
tion and settled more often and on less favorable terms. Or, the lar-
ger settlement rate might reflect greater bargaining power, perhaps
because women prosecutors did not face the possibility of trial by
battle.
In a number of rape cases, however, the terms of the settlement
were recorded: marriage between the appellor and the accused.98 Set-
tling rape cases through marriage was controversial. Glanvill, a late-
twelfth-century treatise, abhorred such settlements, because they
allowed men of humble birth to secure the marriage of women from
good families and because they allowed women of humble birth to
coerce men of noble status into marriage. Nevertheless, the treatise
declared such settlements permissible if both the king and the
families consented.99 Such marriages were also controversial in the
canon law (the law of the Church), although by the thirteenth cen-
tury the weight of opinion was in favor of the legitimacy of such mar-
riages.00 That women consented to such settlements probably reflect-
ed the grim economic prospects of single women in the absence of a
substantial inheritance and the difficulty a non-virgin would have
had in marrying given widespread male insistence upon virgin brides.
Marriage to the rapist might have been the prosecutor's best alter-
native, albeit a rather unfortunate one. On the other hand, when the
rapist was of higher social status, as seems to have been common,
marriage might have been viewed as a favorable settlement."° Two
other explanations for marriage as settlement deserve mention,
although they seem rather implausible. Some historians suggest that,
when a family disapproved of a woman's choice of spouse, the
woman might appeal her lover of rape. By doing so, she might hope
to coerce her family into approval of the match by dashing their
98. Six of the thirty-five settled rape cases in the data set (17%) mention marriage. CROWN
PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYRE, 1249, at pis. 461, 517 (C.A.F. Meekings ed., 16 Wiltshire
Archaeological and Natural History Society, Records Branch 1961); ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES
IN EYRE BEING ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR YORKSHIRE IN 3 HENRY III 1218-19, pl.
959 (Doris Mary Stenton ed., 56 Selden Society 1937); JUST 1/4 m. 30 (Bedfordshire 1247);
JUST 1/358 m. 27 (Kent 1227); JUST 1/1109 m. 18d (Yorkshire 1257). Since the records only
infrequently mention the terms of settlement, marriage was probably an even more common
part of rape settlements than these numbers suggest.
99. GLANVILL, supra note 40, at 176; see also 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 417.
100. BRUNDAGE, supra note 12, at 209-10, 250, 312, 397 (1987); KATHRYN GRAVDAL,
RAVISHING MAIDENS: WRITING RAPE IN MEDIEVAL FRENCH LITERATURE AND LAW 8-9
(1991).
101. Groot, supra note 57, at 328-29; Post, supra note 57, at 152.
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hopes of her marriage to anyone else. 112 Another potential explan-
ation is that the prosecutor had consensual sex with the defendant
with the understanding that they were to wed. When it became clear
that he would not marry her, she brought an appeal of rape."3 In
such a context, termination of the case in exchange for marriage
might have been the desired outcome. On the other hand, appeals of
rape in such circumstances would have been quite risky. If the jury
knew that the sex was consensual, it would acquit the defendant and
fine the prosecutor. In addition, to the extent that the defendant
could anticipate an acquittal, he had little incentive to offer marriage
as settlement.
Table 4 shows how women prosecutors fared before juries.
Table 4. Jury verdicts by sex of prosecutor and offense, 1194-1294
Other All
Assault Homicide Theft Rape crimesa crimes
Male prosecutor, 155 10 22 0 16 203
appellee guilty
Male prosecutor, 94 24 34 0 14 166
appellee not guilty
Female prosecutor, 17 35 5 19 8 84
appellee guilty
Female prosecutor, 11 71 8 31 3 124
appellee not guilty
Male prosecutor, 62% 29% 39% 53% 55%
% of appellees guilty
Female prosecutor, 61% 33% 38% 38% 73% 40%
% of appellees guilty
a. This column includes cases where the case record does not identify the crime.
At first glance, it appears that juries were much more likely to
render guilty verdicts when the prosecutor was a male. Thus, as indi-
cated in the lower right-hand corner of the table, male prosecutors
obtained guilty verdicts in 55% of the cases they prosecuted to trial
and verdict, while women obtained guilty verdicts in only forty per-
cent. Nevertheless, this difference disappears when each crime is an-
102. BARBARA A. HANAWALT, CRIME AND CONFLICT IN ENGLISH COMMUNITIES, 1300-
1348, at 106-07 (1979); Post, supra note 57, at 153. But see HANAWALT, supra note 9, at 132-33
(accusing historians who suggest this explanation of attempting "to shield themselves from the
brutality of rape" and noting the absence of evidentiary support for "this romantic explanation
for rape appeals").
103. See ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES, supra note 98, pl. 669 (The jurors say that "he had her
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alyzed separately. Men and women obtained convictions in assault,
homicide, and theft cases at almost identical rates, while women ob-
tained more convictions in appeals of other and unspecified crimes.'1
4
The lower overall conviction rate for women prosecutors stems from
the fact that women brought fewer assault appeals, which resulted in
abnormally high conviction rates regardless of the prosecutor's gen-
der. In addition, women brought more homicide appeals, and these
appeals resulted in abnormally low conviction rates, whether the
appeal was brought by a man or a woman. Thus, when one controls
for the types of crimes brought, juries seem to have been remarkably
even-handed toward female prosecutors.
Of course, it is possible that juries merely appeared to be even-
handed, but were in fact reluctant to convict based on a woman's
accusation. Perhaps women, anticipating juror distrust of their
accusations, simply failed to bring appeals which they thought they
would lose (but which, if brought by men, would have resulted in
conviction)."15 This selection-bias critique, based on Priest and
Klein's famous article, has some plausibility.' 6 Were this selection-
bias present, however, the number of appeals brought by women
would have been significantly lower, reflecting women's anticipation
of juror distrust. The fact that women brought more than a third of
all appeals suggests that they were not deterred from bringing pro-
secutions. In addition, the possibility discussed below in Part IV.B
that women's appeals of homicide were part of a familial strategy,
suggests that families thought that female prosecutors would get a
fair hearing.
IV. THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN'S APPEALS
A. Appeals, Women, and the Public Sphere
The concept of "separate spheres" has been one of the central
organizing principles of women's history for the last thirty years.' 7
104. None of these differences is statistically significant. All p-values are well above 10%.
105. One might also argue that the similar conviction rates reflect the fact that women
settled more of their cases, perhaps anticipating that jurors would treat them unfairly. This
argument, however, would be incorrect because the table includes jury verdicts even in cases
that settled. See supra pp. 300-01; Klerman, supra note 7, at 37-38, 50-53; Daniel Klerman, The
Selection of Thirteenth-Century Criminal Disputes for Litigation (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
106. George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
107. LINDA K. KERBER, TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF WOMEN 159-99
(1997).
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According to this idea, men and women had different realms of
activity, and this difference helps to explain women's subordination.
Men dominated the public sphere of politics and work outside the
home, while women were relegated to private, domestic activities
such as housework and raising children. Because the public sphere
was more valued and gave men access to the power of the state,
relegation of women to the home guaranteed their inferior position.
According to some historians, the separation of men's and women's
spheres was a product of the industrial revolution and the demo-
cratization of society that began in the late eighteenth century.08
Whereas previously both men and women had worked in and around
the home without much opportunity to participate in politics, the
turn of the nineteenth century created an economy based on larger
scale non-familial organizations and a politics based on broader
participation. Only men were generally allowed to take advantage of
these new opportunities, and an ideology of domesticity and separate
spheres developed to justify women's exclusion.
While the idea of separate spheres remains influential, two power-
ful critiques have emerged. One, championed by Michelle Rosaldo
and Linda Kerber, argues that separate spheres may accurately
describe most human societies but that they fail to explain women's
subordination. 9 By suggesting that men and women inhabit largely
different social worlds, the idea of separate spheres obscures the way
that men and women, by interacting with each other, create and
maintain the system of gender relations. The other critique, voiced
most forcefully by Amanda Vickery and Robert Shoemaker,
criticizes the idea that separate spheres were a creation of the late
eighteenth century.1 ° They argue that both the reality and ideology
of gendered responsibilities and spaces predate the industrial revolu-
tion, and that, in fact, the history of gender relations shows remark-
able continuity going back at least to the seventeenth century, and
perhaps much earlier. 1'
108. LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES: MEN AND WOMEN
OF THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS, 1780-1800 (1987); MARY RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE
CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865 (1981).
109. KERBER, supra note 107, at 159-99; M.Z. Rosaldo, The Use andAbuse of Anthropol-
ogy Reflections on Feminism and Cross-Cultural Understanding, 5 SIGNS: J. WOMEN & CUL-
TURE 389 (1980).
110. ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, GENDER IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1650-1850: THE EMER-
GENCE OF SEPARATE SPHERES? (1998); Amanda Vickery, Golden Age to Separate Spheres?
A Review of the Categories and Chronology of English Women's History, 36 HIST. J. 383
(1993).
111. See Judith Bennett, Medieval Women, Modern Women. Across the Great Divide, in
CULTURE AND HISTORY, 1350-1600: ESSAYS ON ENGLISH COMMUNITIES, IDENTITIES AND
WRITING 147 (David Aers ed., 1992) (extending the argument for continuity back to the mid-
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In spite of these critiques, the idea of separate spheres remains an
important tool for the historical analysis of women and gender. Both
critiques acknowledge that the concept of separate spheres remains
an accurate description of social life.' In fact, the Vickery-Shoemak-
er critique opens up application of the idea of separate spheres to the
medieval period."' In that vein, recent work by Barbara Hanawalt, a
leading medievalist, emphasizes a strand in the separate-spheres
literature that focuses on the gendered nature of space,"4 arguing
that a key to understanding medieval women is mapping the places a
respectable woman could occupy or traverse and those that excluded
her or that would compromise her reputation. In addition, Hanawalt
emphasizes that, when they ventured into public spaces, women were
advised to keep their heads down and be silent.
While there is little literature applying the idea of separate spheres
to women's litigation, the implications are relatively clear. Court was
male space."5 Judges, lawyers, and jurors were exclusively male.
Court was also clearly public, in that it was an arena for the formal
exercise of governmental power. Respectable women were admon-
ished to stay away. For example, Bracton, a thirteenth-century treat-
ise, explained that a male heir ought to control litigation relating to a
widow's dower, because a widow "ought to attend to nothing save
the care of her house and the rearing and education of her chil-
dren . 1.."16 Bracton's argument is hardly persuasive-just one sen-
tence later the treatise notes that the widow ought to have her own
court for pleas pertaining to her as lord-but its very weakness may
testify to the broad acceptance of its premise that litigation was
inappropriate for women. The richer sources of the early modern
period make clear that, in addition to formal legal barriers, "women
were also discouraged from litigating by the idea that a modest
woman speaks little, that a chaste woman does not appear in public,
and that a good woman is ignorant of her rights.""' 7 Nevertheless,
historians have shown that, under certain conditions, courts could be
especially accessible to women. Tim Meldrum demonstrated that, in
dle ages).
112. See Rosaldo, supra note 109, at 396.
113. See also KERBER, supra note 107, at 171 (discussing application of the idea of separ-
ate spheres "to the entire chronology of human experience").
114. HANAWALT, supra note 9, at 70-87; See KERBER, supra note 107, at 188 (describing
"attention to the physical spaces to which women were assigned" as a "third major character-
istic of recent work, one whose potential is at last being vigorously tapped").
115. HANAWALT, supra note 9, at 135.
116. 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 281.
117. Daniel Klerman, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England, in 27 IUS COMMUNE
502, 502-03 (2000) (book review).
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the early eighteenth century, female litigants dominated the ecclesi-
astical courts with suits alleging defamation, principally of a sexual
nature. "8 Across the Atlantic, Cornelia Dayton has shown that the
Puritan exclusion of lawyers and rejection of the double standard for
sexual misconduct made it possible for substantial numbers of
women to litigate in colonial New Haven."9
The research presented here suggests that similar conditions led to
the substantial representation of women among medieval English
private prosecutors. Lawyers were rare in thirteenth-century appeals,
which reduced the financial barriers to women prosecutors. While
the lower cost of appeals would have made them attractive to both
men and women, since women generally had less access to wealth
than men, this aspect of appeals had a particularly large impact on
women. In addition, as discussed above in Part II.C, judges had a
rather deserts-oriented attitude towards appeals. While there were
many technical, procedural rules that might have severely restricted
women's ability to prosecute successfully, judges did not rigorously
enforce them. Rather, their overriding concern to see the guilty pun-
ished caused them to treat women litigants with fairness, if not
indulgence.
The fact that lawyers were rare meant that a female prosecutor
had to appear publicly and make her case.' She had to come to
county court to make her accusation and then, since the appellee
seldom showed up until absolutely necessary, return to county court
several times until he appeared or was outlawed. If she pursued the
case to outlawry, as more than a quarter of women prosecutors did,
she would have to appear five times at county court. If the accused
appeared and remained steadfast in her determination to prosecute,
as happened in about 15% of all cases, she would have to continue
her prosecution in the general eyre, the most awesome manifestation
of royal judicial power outside of Westminster Hall.'' All of these
court appearances would require extensive public speaking, contrary
to the norm counseling women's silence in public places.
Although appeals gave women a public role, this role was not
indicative of public honor or selection as a representative by king or
local community. In fact, especially when prosecuting rape, it is much
more probable that prosecution led to shame and humiliation rather
118. Tim Meldrum, A Women's Court in London: Defamation at the Bishop of Londons
Consistory Court, 1700-1745, 19 LONDON J. 1 (1994).
119. CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, & SOCI-
ETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789 (1995).
120. See Part I.B.
121. BAKER, supra note 8, at 18-19.
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than honor. Women's participation in public life as prosecutors does
not, therefore, detract from their overall exclusion from the honor of
public offices.
In addition, although an appeal would have required the female
prosecutor to appear in court and make her case, prosecution of an
appeal in the thirteenth century required substantially less forensic
skill than a modern criminal case. Prosecuting an appeal consisted
principally of pleading, including recitation of the appropriate legal
formulae and responding to judicial questioning. Since this was the
era of the self-informing jury, the appellor would not ordinarily have
made speeches to the jury or questioned-much less cross-examin-
ed-witnesses.22 Instead, the jury was expected either to investigate
the case before trial or to decide the case based on gossip and repu-
tation. Nevertheless, the task of prosecution should not be minimiz-
ed. An effective prosecution probably required out-of-court lobbying
of jurors. Since mistakes in recitation of the legal formulae could
result in quashing of the appeal, accurate pleading would have re-
quired a good memory. Responding to judicial questions would have
required an ability to think on one's feet. In addition, since the
courts were run by powerful and imposing men (sheriffs and royal
justices), the atmosphere of the courts would likely have been quite
intimidating. Prosecution would, thus, have required considerable
courage and ability to perform publicly under pressure.
There is some irony in the idea that private prosecution gave
women a role in the public sphere. This irony results in part from
anachronistic use of the terms public and private. Thirteenth-century
English men and women did not think of the appeal as private
prosecution or presentment as "public." These are modern terms.
Even as modern terms, they are problematic, as the privateness of
the appeal is only relative. Compared to presentment or modern
public prosecution, appeals are more "private," because they vested
power in ordinary individuals (the victim or a relative of the victim)
rather than in representatives of the public (presenting jurors or
salaried state prosecutors). Nevertheless, like any legal procedure,
appeals required the participation of state actors (such as judges and
sheriffs) and ultimately relied on governmental coercion for enforce-
ment. In addition, appeals were becoming more "public" during the
thirteenth century. As discussed above in Part II.C, in the 1220s and
especially after 1250, appellors lost the power to effectively settle or
terminate a prosecution. Even if an appellor withdrew or if the ap-
peal was quashed for technical reasons, the defendant would still be
122. Klerman, supra note 73. For more on the self-informing jury, see supra p. 301-02.
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put to trial "at the king's suit," and the case would proceed under the
legal fiction that the king was prosecuting.
B. Women, Appeals, and Power
While the previous section deployed an analysis based on the idea
of separate spheres, Rosaldo and Kerber's critique suggests that it is
important to go beyond that approach. Instead of emphasizing the
separateness of men's and women's lives, they suggest that historians
focus on trying to understand how men and women interacted. 3
This section takes up that challenge by analyzing the ways in which
appeals gave women the power to affect others, most often men who
injured them, their relatives, or their property.
The ways in which medieval women exercised power have been an
important topic of historical inquiry. In fact, two recent essay collec-
tions-Power of the Weak: Studies on Medieval Women and Wom-
en and Power in the Middle Ages-take this subject as their theme.2 4
Since women were generally excluded from formal, governmental
office, historians have tended to see women's power as flowing
through more informal channels, such as persuasion, sainthood, land
ownership, and family position. As Mary Erler and Maryanne Kowa-
leski put it, historians have moved "away from a limited and tradi-
tional view of power as public authority to a wider view of power
which encompasses the ability to act effectively, to influence people
or decisions, and to achieve goals."'25
Surprisingly, medieval women's legal power has received little
attention. For example, in the two books mentioned above, only one
essay, by Judith Bennett, takes much note of women's legal activity.
She emphasizes that women's access to court and power "waxed,
waned, and waxed again over the course of the female life cycle" as
women achieved some independence between adolescence and mar-
riage, then lost it upon marriage, and regained it upon widowhood. 6
Erler and Kowaleski's definition of power-"the ability to act ef-
fectively, to influence people or decisions, and to achieve goals"'27-
is quite helpful for the analysis of appeals. Under this broad defini-
tion, the ability to sue others successfully is surely a kind of power.
In particular, appeals allowed women to "influence people or
123. KERBER, supra note 107, at 196-97; Rosaldo, supra note 109, at 409.
124. POWER OF THE WEAK, supra note 5; WOMEN AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES,
supra note 5.
125. Mary Erler & Maryanne Kowaleski, Introduction to WOMEN AND POWER IN THE
MIDDLE AGES, supra note 5, at 1, 2.
126. Bennett, supra note 5, at 21.
127. Erler & Kowaleski, supra note 125, at 2.
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decisions" in that it conferred on them the ability to influence jurors
and judges to render legal decisions in their favor. It allowed them to
"achieve goals," such as punishment of the defendant or settle-
ment.' 28 And it allowed them to "act effectively," or at least as ef-
fectively as men, in that women achieved settlement and conviction
rates comparable to or better than those of men.'29
Although appeals gave women a form of power, that power should
not be overstated. As discussed above in Part II.B, one of the
reasons women brought appeals was that they had been victimized-
assaulted, raped, or robbed. The potential power that appeals gave
women had, at least in these situations, not been sufficient to deter
the crime. Another reason women brought so many appeals, especi-
ally homicide appeals, was that they were immune from trial by
battle and thus could prosecute crimes of interest to their families
without the danger male members of the family might encounter. In
these situations, women may have been pressured into prosecuting.
Nevertheless, even when prosecution was the result of victimization
or family pressure, it was still a form of power. A crime victim who
can prosecute is more powerful than one who, like a slave, has no
power to prosecute or who, like a child, must depend on others to
prosecute on her behalf. Similarly, although a woman's prosecution
may have been in her family's interest, to the extent that a woman's
interests were aligned with those of her family, prosecution in the
family interest may have benefited her as well.
The power of women's appeals may also have been limited by the
possibility that women's appeals, even if successful, may have pro-
voked social disapproval or even physical vengeance. To the extent
that women prosecutors were violating social norms about women's
proper role, the possibility of such disapproval or vengeance cannot
be excluded. Unfortunately, the legal records shed little light on
these possibilities, although violent retaliation could itself have
resulted in a subsequent appeal or presentment.
The case below, which was heard in the 1249 Wiltshire eyre,
illustrates the power that appeals gave women.
Alice, who was the wife of Henry of Wyly, appealed Robert
Pycot, Robert Sterre and Gilbert Chynne in that against the
King's peace wickedly and in felony they ejected her by force
128. For a related argument about prosecution and power in a subsequent period, see
Douglas Hay, Prosecution and Power: Malicious Prosecution in English Courts, 1750-1850, in
POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 343 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder
eds., 1989).
129. See supra Tables 3 & 4.
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from a house in Salisbury. That they did this etc. she offers [to
prove] etc.
Robert Pycot is dead. Robert Sterre and Gilbert come and
deny the force and whatsoever is against the king's peace. They
fully admit that they ejected Alice from the house but not in
robbery, rather by judgment of the Court of Salisbury and by
the command of Robert Pycot then mayor of Salisbury. On this
they put themselves on a jury and call the aforesaid Court to
warranty. Upon this the aforesaid Court comes and says that
Henry of Wyly, sometime Alice's husband, held the house and
after Henry's death Alice was in seisin of the house for half a
year. Then Avice, Henry's sister, sought the house in the Court
of Salisbury saying that Alice was never married to Henry. And,
because it did not appear to the Court whether Alice was mar-
ried to Henry or not, the Court presented the seisin of the house
to Avice. But they did not warrant that Alice should be ejected
from the house by force. And because the aforesaid Court held
this plea without writ and warrant it is held that the aforesaid
Court be in mercy and let Robert Sterre and Gilbert, because
they dispossessed [Alice of her house,] be taken into custody for
the offence etc.
Later it is testified that Alice received seisin of the house
because she proved that she was married to Henry and that
Henry in his will left her the house."3
Alice, a widow living in a house given to her by her husband, was
evicted from that house after losing a suit in the Court of Salisbury.
Although Alice had civil remedies to recover her house, she chose to
bring an appeal against the mayor of Salisbury, who ordered her
eviction, and against the men who carried out that eviction. Al-
though her appeal did not fall within the two categories permitted to
women (rape or injury to her body), the defendants did not object,
and her appeal was successful. The justices in eyre found that the
Court of Salisbury had acted improperly in depriving her of her
house without a royal writ. As a result, the living defendants were or-
dered jailed, probably as a prelude to stiff fines. In addition, al-
though the timing and circumstances are not clear, it appears that the
justices in eyre allowed her to prove the substance of her claim to the
house-that she was married to Henry and that Henry left her the
house in his will. The power Alice wielded through this appeal is
130. CROWN PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYRE, 1249, supra note 98, pl. 553.
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rather impressive. She successfully sued the mayor of Salisbury and
two men who were carrying out his orders, secured an order for their
imprisonment, and recovered both possession and title to her house.
More generally, the legal power of an appellor was substantial.
Appeals could lead to the imposition of serious penalties. If the
defendant did not appear in court to respond to charges, he was
outlawed. As mentioned above, an outlaw was a person without legal
rights. 3' He forfeited all his property, and it was a crime to feed, shel-
ter, or communicate with him. If he resisted arrest, he could be killed
without further legal process.'32 Women successfully outlawed
defendants in about a quarter of all appeals they initiated. If, on the
other hand, the defendant appeared for trial and was convicted, he
could be executed or fined. Such outcomes were not as common as
outlawry, but hardly rare. Thus, the appeal allowed women to im-
pose substantial penalties on those who harmed them. Perhaps more
importantly, although it cannot be proved directly, the fact that
women had the power to initiate criminal prosecutions probably
deterred some potential malefactors.
A crime victim could also use the threat of prosecution to induce
settlements, which might consist of cash, land, or resolution of other
disputes.'33 In addition, as discussed above, rape cases were some-
times settled by marriage between the appellor and the man she had
previously accused of rape. Although marriage to the man who
raped her was undoubtedly a rather unfavorable settlement, it does
not negate the idea that the appeal gave the prosecutor a modicum
of power. To the extent that rape reduced a woman's marriage-
ability, the fact that the appeal allowed the victim to pressure the
defendant into marrying her conferred a benefit on the prosecutor.
That such a marriage seems odious should not detract from the fact
that it might have been preferable to the alternatives: impoverish-
131. Women accused of crime could not technically be outlawed. Instead, a woman who
failed to appear at county court was "waived," that is, declared a "waif. Nevertheless, the
procedure and consequences of waiver and outlawry were the same, so this difference is of no
importance. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 482. Although outlawry was relatively
severe, outlaws could secure pardons from the king. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra, at
581-82.
132. 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at 361-62, 378.
133. It is interesting in this regard to contrast the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries.
Laurie Edelstein has recently argued that eighteenth-century rape prosecutions were not
brought to induce negotiation, settlement, and/or marriage. Edelstein, supra note 72, at 376-89
(1998). She adduces a number of factors, including the humiliation and cost of rape trials, to
explain why such a motivation was implausible. The data presented above in Table 3 suggest
that over half of thirteenth-century rape appeals resulted in settlement. In part, the greater
frequency of settlement may reflect differences between thirteenth- and eighteenth-century
procedure, such as the low cost of appeals and the absence of cross-examination at trial.
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ment as a single woman or an even less favorable marriage. Thus, the
prosecutor's power could not right the wrong done to her but could
improve her post-crime position, even if only slightly.
Although historians generally emphasize women's loss of indepen-
dent power upon marriage, appeals provide an interesting, although
limited, counter-example. As discussed in the next section, at least
5% of female appellors were married women suing alone. Although
this percentage is certainly lower than the percentage of married
women in the population, it is noteworthy that married women were
bringing suits at all.
Another way to appreciate the power that appeals provided is to
contrast appeals of rape with trespass actions for ravishment.
Whereas rape appeals were brought only by the aggrieved woman
herself, ravishment actions were brought by husbands, fathers, and
lords. Ravishment was the tort of abducting and/or raping a woman,
and such claims became common around the turn of the fourteenth
century. Such suits sometimes arose out of a woman's marriage con-
trary to the will of her father or her desertion of her husband in or-
der to abscond with a lover.'34 In such situations, vesting the right to
bring ravishment actions in fathers and husbands gave men addition-
al power over women. In contrast, the requirement that the female
victim bring a rape appeal made it nearly impossible for an appeal to
be used to thwart her choice of husband or lover.
As discussed above in Part II.A, women brought approximately
eight thousand appeals during the thirteenth century. Although this
may seem like a large number, it pales in comparison to the number
of women who lived in England during this period, which probably
approached ten million.'35 Thus, probably only about one in every
thousand thirteenth-century English women ever brought an appeal
during her lifetime. The proportion of women who actually exercised
the power of an appeal was therefore relatively small. On the other
hand, to the extent that women's ability to bring appeals had a deter-
rent effect, appeals may have had a broader impact.
134. Brand, supra note 16, at 65-66; Post, supra note 57, at 157-60.
135. Estimating the number of women who lived during the thirteenth century is very diffi-
cult. Most probably there were between one and two million women in 1200 and almost double
that number in 1300. J.L. BOLTON, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH ECONOMY, 1150-1500, at 65
(1980). Average life expectancy was thirty to forty years. Id at 48. Together, these figures
imply that between five and ten million women lived in England in the thirteenth century.
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C Social Status of Female Prosecutors
Many studies of women and power in the middle ages focus on up-
per class women.'36 One advantage of legal records is that they often
shine light on less prominent people. Records from manorial courts
have been especially fruitful for the investigation of ordinary
people. 3 7 Royal courts, in contrast, tended to hear disputes only by
those who held "freehold" property, that is, property unencumbered
by the obligations a peasant ordinarily owed his lord. Appeals,
although heard in royal court, seem to have been brought by a broad
spectrum of society and thus can help shed light on the lives of
ordinary women.
Although the records of appeals seldom indicate people's status, it
is possible to ascertain the status of some female appellors by look-
ing at other legal and administrative records. For most of England,
this would be a very difficult task, because those other records are
generally unpublished and unindexed. For late thirteenth-century
Huntingdonshire, however, scholars have compiled a Regional Data
Bank, which facilitates identification of people from that county. 8
By tracking female appellors mentioned in the 1286 Huntingdon-
shire eyre, one can see that ordinary villagers dominated the ranks of
female appellors. There were sixteen female prosecutors mentioned
in the 1286 Huntingdonshire eyre.'39 The social status of nine of them
can be identified. Seven (78%) were villagers4 ' and two (22%) were
"regional landowners,"' 4 ' a class intermediate between villagers and
knights.'42 Although it is hazardous to speculate about the six whose
status is not identified in contemporary records, it is quite likely that
they were also ordinary villagers, as it is unlikely that knights or
regional landowners would have left no imprint in surviving records.
If this speculation is correct, then 88% of female appellors would
have been villagers.
Sometimes the eyre records themselves make it clear that the
appellor came from modest circumstances. For example, in 5% of all
136. See supra note 5.
137. See Bennett, supra note 5.
138. See, 1 ROYAL JUSTICE AND THE MEDIEVAL COUNTRYSIDE: THE HUNTINGDON-
SHIRE EYRE OF 1286, THE RAMSEY ABBEY BANLIEU COURT OF 1287, AND THE ASSIZES OF
1287-88, supra note 78, at xi.
139. See id. cases 370, 391, 394, 397, 404, 407, 444, 447, 464, 549, 513, 526, 558, 634, 789 &
805. For this purpose, I have included the two appeals (cases 789 and 805) brought by women
mentioned in the 1287 Ramsey Abbey Banlieu Court.
140. See id. cases 391, 394, 397, 444, 549, 558 & 789.
141. See id. cases 513, 536.
142. See id. at 68.
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cases, fines female appellors incurred were pardoned "on account of
poverty," as in Gunora's case.' Since fines were not imposed in
every case, the number of poor women prosecutors undoubtedly
exceeded five percent. How poor a woman had to be to qualify for a
remission of fines on account of poverty is unclear. The ordinary fine
imposed in the eyre was half a mark, or 6s. 8d. That would have been
a trivial sum for any significant landholder, but almost certainly more
than the average peasant could pay.' On the other hand, it is appar-
ent that such pardons were sometimes given even to those who were
not poor. For example, in Gunora's case, Gunora's fine was pardon-
ed even though, having just received four acres in settlement, she
would hardly still qualify as poor." 5
The records sometimes mention an appellor's occupation. So, for
example, one female prosecutor is described as a washerwoman
(lotrMx) .46 She was undoubtedly of humble status.
It is also likely that an additional 10% of female appellors were
poor. In addition to the 5% whose fines were pardoned on account
of poverty, 10% of female appellors are recorded not to have found
sureties to prosecute and instead merely swore that they would pro-
secute. Swearing rather than finding sureties is probably indicative of
poverty. Occasionally, the link between swearing and poverty is
explicit in the records,' but it is a plausible inference even in cases
where the connection is not patent.'48 Appellors ordinarily initiated
their suits at county court and were required at that time to
nominate sureties. If the appellor later failed to show up for trial or
withdrew her suit, or if the appellee was acquitted, the appellor was
fined. If the appellor could not or would not pay, the sureties were
liable for the fine. Sureties naturally wanted some assurance that the
appellor could pay her own fines or would indemnify them for any
fines they paid. Poor litigants would be the group most likely to be
unable to provide such assurance, so it is likely that those who failed
143. Supra text accompanying note 30.
144. See CHRISTOPHER DYER, STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 70,
117 (1989).
145. Id.
146. 2 PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, 1198-1202, pl. 15 (Doris Mary Stenton
ed., 68 Selden Society 1952) (Norfolk 1198).
147. CROWN PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYRE, 1249, supra note 98, at pls. 130, 517, 562;
JUST 1/614B m. 41d (Northamptonshire 1247) ("non habuit plegios nisi fidem quia pauper");
JUST 1/615 m. 3 (Northamptonshire 1253) ("non invenit plegios quia pauper"); id. at m. 5d;
JUST 1/361 m. 50 (Kent 1255) ("nec invenit plegios nisi fidem quia pauper"); id at m. 53d
(Kent 1255) ("non invenit plegios nisi fidem pro paupertate").
148. See Groot, supra note 57, at 328; Ralph Pugh, Introduction to WILTSHIRE GAOL
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to find sureties were most often poor. Nevertheless, the correlation is
not iron-clad. In some cases, although the appellor did not find
sureties to prosecute, her fine for non-prosecution was not pardoned
on account of poverty.4' The lack of a perfect correlation between
failure to find sureties and poverty might suggest that the fact that
10% of female appellors are recorded as not having found sureties
would mean that less than 10% were poor. Nevertheless, one must
also take into account that whether an appellor found sureties is
recorded in less than half of the cases. So, the 10% figure may
substantially under-count the number of poor female appellors.
The substantial uncertainty that surrounds who was classified as
"poor" for the purposes of pardoning fines and who would be unable
to find sureties makes it impossible to give a precise figure for the
percentage of female appellors who were poor. Any figure from
about 5% to over 30% would be plausible. Nevertheless, it seems
safe to conclude that a significant number of female appellors were
from modest circumstances.
Examination of the marital status of female appellors also reveals
considerable diversity. Naming provides the principal clue to marital
status. Those called "A who used to be B's wife" (A que fuit uxorB)
can safely be categorized as widows. Similarly, those called "A wife
of B" (A uxor B) can be safely categorized as married. Names such
as "A from place X" (A de X) or "A daughter of B" (A 1iia B) give
no information on marital status. Although such women might have
been married or widowed, I will generally assume they were never
married unless there is other evidence of their marital status.
The overwhelming majority of female appellors were either
widowed or never married. Most homicides were prosecuted by
widows.15 In addition, 6% (14/229) of women who appealed crimes
other than homicide were widows. Nearly all rapes were prosecuted
by never-married women."' A small, but appreciable fraction (5% or
149. See, e.g., COLLECTIONS FOR A HISTORY OF STAFFORDSHIRE 41 (William Wrottesley
ed., 3 William Salt Archaeological Society 1882) (Staffordshire 1199).
150. See infra Table 2.
151. A few rape appeals were prosecuted by married women and widows. See JUST 1/358
m. 27d (Kent 1227) (rape appeal by widow); CROWN PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYRE, 1249,
supra note 98, pl. 296 (rape appeal by widow); Id. pl. 207 (rape appeal by married woman). The
legality of such appeals is unclear. Although the married women and widows who brought
these appeals were presumably not virgins, there is a case from 1244 which held that only those
who were virgins before the rape could bring appeals. See Post, supra note 57, at 153. Never-
theless, there are cases (although not many) both before and after 1244 that seem inconsistent
with a rule against rape prosecutions by non-virgins. See Groot, supra note 57, at 325; JUST
1/359 m. 30d (Kent 1241); see also cases cited supra. In addition, the treatises attributed to
Bracton and Britton assume that there was no such rule. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 36, at
415, 418 (discussing rape of married women, widows, and prostitutes); 1 BRITTON, supra note
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23/452) of all female appellors were married women. This figure is
interesting, because it is usually thought that a married woman's
legal personality merged into her husband's through coverture.'5 2 In
some cases, a married woman's right to appeal was challenged,'53 but
in most cases it was not. Because of the reliance on naming, these
figures almost certainly understate the number of appeals brought by
widowed and married women.
V. CONCLUSION
The number of appeals declined markedly in the late thirteenth
century.'54 Presentment became the nearly exclusive means of prose-
cuting crime. Since the presenting jury was entirely male, the decline
of the appeal meant a reduction in the role of women.'55 One might
see this decline in the status of women as part of a general, Europe-
wide "tendency, as the Middle Ages progressed ... towards a lessen-
ing of the public activity of women."'56 Susan Mosher Stuard has ex-
plained this trend as reflecting "the failure of early medieval society
to define rigidly a public and a private sphere and to relegate women
to the latter."' As the quote from Bracton in Part IV.A reveals, by
the thirteenth century, such a distinction had been clearly made. The
prominence of the appeal until at least the late twelfth century may
reflect the earlier lack of separation between public and private. Al-
36, at 114 ("With regard to an appeal of rape, our pleasure is, that every woman, whether
virgin or no, shall have a right to sue vengeance for the felony by appeal...."). But see 2
BRACTON, supra note 36, at 344, 414, 416-17 (assuming that rape appeal will be brought by one
who was a virgin before being raped).
152. See supra pp. 283-84, 296.
153. COLLECTIONS FOR A HISTORY OF STAFFORDSHIRE, supra note 149, at 92 (man fined
because he permitted his wife to appeal, but did not want to prosecute with her); THE EARLI-
EST NORTHAMPTONSHIRE ASSIZE ROLLS, A.D. 1202 AND 1203, supra note 67, pl. 70 (appeal
quashed, because married woman did not prosecute with her husband); JUST 1/358 m. 21d
(Kent 1227) (appellees not attached, because female appellor did not prosecute when her hus-
band, although present, did not prosecute with her); JUST 1/4 m. 29d (Bedfordshire 1247)
(appellee asked the court to note that the woman who appealed him of robbery and wounds
could have no property because she was married, but appellee submitted to jury trial anyway).
154. See Klerman, supra note 7, at 22-31.
155. Of course, since almost two-thirds of appellors were men, there was also a decline in
the prosecutorial role of many men as well. Nevertheless, since men could be on presenting
juries while women could not, the move to presentment had the effect of removing all women
from prosecution, while merely shifting the male prosecutorial role from one group (crime vic-
tims and their relatives) to another (the presenting jury). Nevertheless, to the extent that pre-
senting juries (and later grand juries) were composed primarily of higher status men, the shift
to presentment may have resulted in the exclusion of lower status men from prosecution.
156. Susan Mosher Stuard, Introduction to WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY, supra note 3,
at 1, 3.
157. Id. at 4; see also Jane Tibbetts Schulenburg, Female Sanctity Public and Private
Roles, ca. 500-1100, in WOMEN AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 5, at 102, 105.
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though I have sometimes referred to the appeal as "private prose-
cution," it was neither entirely private nor entirely public. Although
the individuals brought appeals, they lay only when the king's peace
had been violated and thus when more than the victim's own interest
was affected. The introduction of presentment in the twelfth century
and its ascendance in the thirteenth can be seen as reflecting the sep-
aration of private and public, putting prosecution of breaches of the
king's peace in the hands of representatives of the community (the
presenting jury) rather than in those of the victim.' 8 In this way, the
marginalization of women through the ascendance of presentment
fits Stuard's theory that the separation of public and private harmed
women.
A different but complementary interpretation would note that the
increasing power of the state in the thirteenth century often imposed
and enforced dichotomies-male/female, orthodox/heterodox, Chris-
tian/Jew, heterosexual/homosexual-which disadvantaged the smal-
ler or less powerful group.'59 Early medieval society had been less
effectively governed, and thus enforced rigid distinctions less often.
Gays and Jews, although occasionally persecuted, were usually left in
peace and often rose to prominence. Heretics were not subjected to
the rigors of the inquisition. Women could govern both monks and
nuns in double monasteries. They could prosecute.
This is not to imply equality. Early medieval women could be
powerful abbesses, but they could not be priests or bishops. Women
could bring appeals, but the crimes for which they could do so were
circumscribed. But it does seem that the rise of presentment, an insti-
tution which explicitly excluded women, was part of a more general
phenomenon in which the newly emergent European states used
their control of the legal system to exclude certain groups from
power and public life.
While the previous two paragraphs attempt to provide a broader
historical context for thinking about the decline of women's role as
prosecutor, they must be regarded as tentative. The kind of historical
generalizations upon which they rely have been criticized as part of a
romantic search for a "golden age.""'6 Although the specific general-
158. The introduction of trespass writs in the mid-thirteenth century, however, again
muddled the distinctions between public and private, and between civil and criminal. Klerman,
supra note 7, at 44.
159. JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 270-71
(1980); R.I. MOORE, THE FORMATION OF A PERSECUTING SOCIETY 1 (1987).
160. Judith M. Bennett, "History that Stands Still" Women's Work in the European Past,
14 FEMINIST STUD. 269 (1988); Pauline Stafford, Women and the Norman Conquest, 4 TRANS-
ACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y. (6 ' Ser.) 221 (1994); Vickery, supra note 110, at 383-414.
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izations-that the distinction between public and private became
more rigid during the middle ages and that governments in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries enforced a greater number of disad-
vantaging distinctions-remain substantially unchallenged, ' it is not
unthinkable that historians in the future will refute them. While the
evidence presented in this Article supports these more general hypo-
theses, the verdict awaits additional research. As Janet Loengard
suggested, an Article such as this one is best seen as "a piece in the
mosaic that must be constructed, the jigsaw that must be put
together." 62
Although this Article has focused on thirteenth-century England,
there is reason to believe that women played a significant role in
prosecuting crime in other pre-modern societies, especially those
that relied on private prosecution.'63 The legal systems in nearly all of
medieval Europe allowed private prosecution, yet the role of female
prosecutors remains largely unexplored. In England, private pro-
secution remained an important aspect of criminal procedure until
the mid-nineteenth century. What roles did women play in these
prosecutions? If women brought prosecutions, did they actually con-
trol them, or was prosecution effectively in the hands of husbands
and relatives? Did women speak in court, or did lawyers or relatives
speak for them? Did prosecution contribute to women's power?
These questions are likely to have different answers in different
places and at different times. Nevertheless, answering them will
enrich our understanding of the history of gender and of law.
161. See Bennett, supra note 160, at 282 n.8.
162. Janet Senderowitz Loengard, "Legal History and the Medieval Englishwoman" Re-
visited: Some New Directions, in MEDIEVAL WOMEN AND THE SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL HIS-
TORY 219 (Joel T. Rosenthal ed., 1990).
163. See, e.g., COHN, supra note 50, at 27, 33 (documenting significant numbers of female
plaintiffs in private criminal prosecution in fourteenth-century Florence).
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